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THE REGULATIONS UNDER SECTION 385:
A REVIEW, EVALUATION, AND SUGGESTED APPROACH
JESSE V. BOYLES t
J. RUSH tt

RANDOLPH

I. INTRODUCTION

EVERY TAX SCHOLAR AND PRACTITIONER IS AWARE
of the problems associated with the classification of securities as
debt or equity interests, particularly in closely-held corporations.'
This tax area is abundant with litigation striving to establish dis2
tinctions between these two fundamental sources of corporate funds.
The large body of case law has established the principle that a shareholder generally intends to place his money at the risk of the business and share in the profits and losses of the enterprise in which his
right to payment is contingent.3 A creditor, on the other hand,
generally does not expect to share in the corporation's profits, but
rather expects the debtor corporation to fulfill its "unqualified
obligation to pay a sum certain at a reasonably close fixed maturity
t Assistant Professor, School of Accounting, University of Florida, B.S.,
1968, M.B.A., 1971, Ph.D., 1975, University of Florida. Member, Federal
Taxation Committee, Florida Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
ff Associate, Anderson and Rush, Orlando, Florida. B.S.B.A., 1977, J.D.,
1980, LL.M. (Taxation), 1981, University of Florida. Member, Florida Bar.
1. This problem most commonly arises in closely-held corporations because the shareholders, often also acting as officers of the corporation, are
able to control the label the corporation gives to the shareholder in advance.
Although large public corporations occasionally find the Internal Revenue
Service challenging the validity of an instrument purported to be debt.
it would seem easier for a corporation with a large number of shareholders to
survive the attack. See Monon R.R. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 845 (1970),
acq. 1973-2 C.B. 3 (widely-held public corporation with 1,200 shareholders
established validity of debenture).
The regulations under § 385 recognize this dichotomy by exempting
the instruments of public corporations from several of the rules which classify
an instrument as stock. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-3(b)(2)(ii), -6(a)(3)(i),
-6(a)(3)(ii) (1980).
2. This area of case law has been described as "a 'jungle' of several hundred court decisions which 'defy symmetry.'"
Plumb, The Federal Income
Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26
TAX L. REV. 369, 370 (1971). In the last decade alone, over 200 court decisions by the Tax Court and federal appellate courts have dealt in some way
with the distinction between debt and equity.
3. See, e.g., Slappey Drive Indus. Park v. Commissioner, 561 F.2d 572,
581 (5th Cir. 1977); Finance Corp. v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 786, 789-90
(3d Cir. 1962); Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 12 (2d
Cir. 1935); Litton Business Sys., Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367, 377
(1973).
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date along with a fixed percentage in interest payable regardless of
the debtor's income or lack thereof." 4 Nevertheless, the case law
has failed to produce any fully satisfactory guidelines for distinguishing debt and equity instruments for tax purposes." Instead, each
case is said to be determined on its own set of facts," with the courts
applying as many as sixteen factors 7 in an effort to ascertain the
intent of the parties to the transaction. The classification of the
instrument as debt or equity is then based upon the intent of the
parties in accordance with the general principles set forth above.,
4. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 402 (2d Cir. 1957).
5. See Plumb, supra note 2, at 407. The drafters of the § 385 regulations acknowledge this fact. See Supplementary Information to Proposed
One commentator has
Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,957, 18,958 (1980).
stated that there is "no more frustrating and wasteful area" in all of the
tax law. See Dixon, The Interest-Dividend Syndrome: What Are The Criteria Now?, 24 N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAX 1267, 1267 (1966).
6. Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159, 165 (6th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957). See Plumb, supra note 2, at
408.
7. See Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir.
1968). One writer has identified 38 factors which the courts have taken into
account. See Holzman, The Interest-Dividend Guidelines, 47 TAXEs 4 (1969).
The Fifth Circuit has identified 13 factors which merit consideration in determining the intent of the parties:
(1) the names given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness;
(2) [t]he presence or absence of a fixed maturity date;
(3) [t]he source of payments;
(4) [t]he right to enforce payment of principal and interest;
(5) participation in management flowing as a result;
(6) the status of the contribution in relation to regular corporate
creditors;
(7) the intent of the parties;
(8) "thin" or adequate capitalization;
(9) identity of interest between creditor and stockholder;
(10) source of interest payments;
(11) the ability of the corporation to obtain loans from outside lending institutions;
(12) the extent to which the advance was used to acquire capital assets; and
(13) the failure of the debtor to repay on the due date or to seek a
postponement.
Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 1972). See also
A. R. Lantz Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1970) (11
factors). See generally Plumb, supra note 2, at 407-555.
8. A.R. Lantz Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1970).
The usefulness of these criteria is limited because they rarely point in the
same direction and the factors have no established relative weights. See, e.g.,
Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 1972); Dixie
Dairies Corp. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 476 (1980). See generally Plumb,
supra note 2, at 407-08. In addition, a court may apply various factors to one
case and not to another. See, e.g., In re Uneco, Inc., 532 F.2d 1204, 1207 (8th
Cir. 1976); Dixie Dairies Corp. v. Commissioner, supra. Most courts precede their lists of factors with a caveat similar to the following:
Similar questions have been before this tribunal and other courts,
and with each one it was necessary to consider all facts and cir-
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In an attempt to reduce the uncertainty accorded the treatment
of interests as stock or indebtedness, Congress enacted section 385
of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) 9 as part of the Tax Reform
Act of 1969.10 This provision authorizes the Secretary of the
Treasury (Secretary) to prescribe the "necessary or appropriate"
regulations to determine whether an interest in a corporation is to
be treated, for all purposes of the Code, as stock or indebtedness.11
The regulations were to set forth factors to determine whether a
debtor-creditor or a corporation-shareholder relationship exists.12
On December 29, 1980, over ten years after the enactment of section
385, the Secretary issued final regulations under this Code provision.' 3 This article examines sections 1.385-1 through 1.385-10 of
the regulations. Each provision in the regulations is summarized
and evaluated with respect to its consistency with congressional intent and administrative authority, as well as with respect to existing
judicial precedent. Where appropriate, comments will also be made
regarding the potential impact of the provision upon popular financcumstances in the particular case in order to determine if the relationship was that of stock ownership or debtor and creditor. In
some cases the determining characteristic has been one factor, while
in other cases it has been another. No one factor is necessarily controlling.
John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 457, 462 (1943), rev'd, 146 F.2d
466 (7th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 326 U.S. 521 (1946). Accord, Scriptomatic, Inc. v.
United States, 555 F.2d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 1977); Midlands Distribs., Inc, v.
United States, 481 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1973); Fin Hay Realty Co. v.
United States, 398 F.2d 694, 697 (3d Cir. 1968); Georgia-Pacific Corp.
v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 790, 796 (1975); Family Group, Inc. v. Commissioner
59 T.C. 660, 668 (1973).
9. I.R.C. § 385.
10. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1970). Congress was concerned
about the increased level of corporate mergers and the increasing use of debt
in corporate acquisitions, which were due in part to the favorable tax consequences accorded debt as opposed to stock. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 137 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 103 (1969).
In its version of the Reform Act, the House enacted § 279 of the Code, which
disallows a corporate interest deduction with respect to certain types of
indebtedness which are issued as consideration for the acquisition of the

debt of another corporation. See I.R.C. § 279(a) (1976).

Thus, § 279 resolves

the question of whether interest payments are deductible as interest in the
limited context of corporate acquisitions.
The Senate, in addition to adopting § 279, determined that it would be
desirable to provide rules for distinguishing debt from equity in situations
other than corporate acquisitions in which this problem arises. See S. REP.
No. 552, supra, at 138. However, it was felt that the variety of contexts in
which this distinction was significant made it too difficult to enact comprehensive and specific statutory rules. Id. Thus, § 385 was enacted to authorize

the Secretary to promulgate guidelines.
11. See I.R.C. § 385(a).
12. Id. § 385(b).

Id. See I.R.C. § 385(a).

13. See T.D. 7747, 1981-8 I.R.B. 15.
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ing arrangements, the fairness of the particular provision, and the
ability of taxpayers to understand and apply the particular provision.
This analysis should be of interest for a number of reasons.
Iost importantly, these regulations will have a significant impact
upon tax practice because the determination as to whether an interest is debt or equity is relevant to a broad range of regularly
encountered tax situations.' 4 Along these same lines, the enforcement of these regulations in their present form will have a substantial effect upon the availability of funds for many corporations,
particularly smaller entities, and on the form such advances will
take.'0
Neither the statutory language nor the legislative history provides any insight with respect to the policy to be implemented by the
regulations. As a result, ambiguous regulations will be difficult for
taxpayers, the Internal Revenue Service (Service), and the courts to
interpret and apply. Confusion may be intensified by the fact that
there are no principles consistently applied by the courts in the divergent situations in which the distinction between stock and debt is
crucial for tax purposes. 16 Similarly, present differences in the tax
treatment of debt and equity do not provide useful policy guidance.
Therefore, it may be concluded that no conceptual framework
exists which can provide a theoretical basis for interpretation
of these regulations. Thus, if provisions in the regulations are
difficult to understand and apply, it is possible that these regulations
may cause as much confusion and litigation as presently exists without them.
The broad impact of these regulations may force many taxpayers into taking aggressive positions with respect to the specific
provisions contained therein. Consequently, an analysis of the vulnerability of these regulations to attack may prove extremely helpful.
The Secretary's authority to issue these regulations stems from
two sources. First, section 7805 of the Code vests the Secretary with
the general authority to prescribe interpretive regulations for all
purposes under the Code.1 7 Second, in section 385 Congress specifically authorized the Secretary to prescribe the "necessary or appro14. See notes 35-52 and accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text infra.
. 16. One court described the decisions as "defy[ing] symmetry." Tyler v.
Tomlinson, 414 F.2d 844, 847 (5th Cir. 1969). See generally Comment, Towards
New Modes of Tax Decision Making-The Debt-Equity Imbroglio and Dislocations in the Tax Lawmaking Responsibility, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1695,
1705-07 (1970).
17. I.R.C. §7805(a)(1978).
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priate" regulations to determine whether an interest is to be treated
as indebtedness or stock for all purposes under the Code.' 8 How-.
ever, authority to prescribe regulations is not equivalent to legislation by statute. 19 The courts have not followed regulations where
such regulations exceeded the Treasury's authority, 20 although regulations which are expressly authorized by statute carry a strong presumption of validity.21 As a result, it seems that taxpayers attempting to invalidate a section 385 regulation will have a heavy burden
to demonstrate that the Secretary has exceeded his authority. Nevertheless, in the case of section 385, the statutory delegation of rulemaking authority is unusual in that the Senate report refers to the
development of "regulatory guidelines" setting forth "factors" to
be "taken into account," 22 instead of simply stating that the classification of stock and debt "shall be in accordance with rules to be
prescribed by the Secretary." This latter form of delegation is the
23
most common type.
In light of the unusual nature of the Secretary's authority under
section 385, both the New York State Bar 24 and the American Bar
Association 25 suggest that taxpayers may defend their debt positions
by attacking the regulations as lacking authoritative support. In
18. Id. § 385(a).

See note II and accompanying text supra.

§ 3.21 (1974).
20. Id. § 3.20. See, e.g., Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner,
297 U.S. 129 (1936); Bates v. United States, 581 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1978);
Smith v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1964); Arkansas-Oklahoma
Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 98, 102 (8th Cir. 1953).
21. A regulation issued pursuant to a specific delegation of authority is
known as a "legislative regulation" and is "binding upon a court as a statute if
it is (a) within the granted power, (b) issued pursuant to proper procedure and
I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.03 (1958).
(c) reasonable."
As such, the courts have indicated that greater weight should be accorded to
such regulations than to an interpretative regulation. 1 J. MERTENS, supra
19. 1 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

note 19, § 3.20.

22. S.REP. No. 552, supra note 10, at 138.
23. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 44A(g) (1978), 44B(b) (1980), 105(h)(9) (1980), 125(h)
(1980), 190(d) (1976), 405(h) (1976), 913(m) (1980), 2622 (1976), 3506(c) (1977),
6166(i) (1978). Other sections of the Code delegate authority in the same manner, but are more specific in detailing what subjects the regulations may deal
with. See, e.g., id. §§ 58(h) (1980), 280A(d) (1978), 382(c) (1980), 504(b) (1976),
904(f) (1980), 995(e) (1978), 2032A(g) (1978), 3507(d) (1980), 6107(c) (1976), 6110
(f) (1976).
24. See Beghe, Redrawing the Lines Between Corporate Debt and Equity
Interests: The Proposed Regulations Under Section 385, 58 TAXES 931, 933
& n.15 (1980), citing NEW YORK STATE BAR TAX SECTION, REPORT ON PROPOSED
REGULATIONS § 1.385: THE TAX DISTINCTION BETWEEN CORPORATE DEBT AND
EQUITY

(August 1980).

25. Beghe, supra note 24, at 933 & n.16, citing AMERICAN
TAX

SECTION

REPORT, COMMENTS

ON

PROPOSED

REGULATIONS

BAR ASSOCIATION
UNDER

SECTION

385 (October 1980).
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other words, it may be argued that Congress intended the regulations
to provide guidelines for applying a multi-factor approach along the
lines of the case law, and not necessarily to prescribe binding or conclusive determinations. 20 If this argument is correct, then any provision in these regulations that dictates what form the various aspects
of each instrument must take, or that provides for conclusive determinations of the tax consequences of various transactions by a corporate taxpayer, may be vulnerable to attack under the rationale that
such provisions exceed the Secretary's statutory authority. Likewise,
specific provisions in the regulations which are clearly at odds with
existing case law may be vulnerable based upon the same reasoning.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the broad grant of authority and
the presumption of validity granted this type of administrative enactment may make the courts unwilling to accept such arguments.
With these thoughts in mind, as well as the fact that the Secretary has recently extended the effective date. of these regulations to
January 1, 1982 27 in order to allow more time for comment and
reconsideration, an analysis such as this may also be of some assistance in evaluating the appropriateness of these regulations.
The order of presentation of the various rules set forth in the
regulations appears to be convoluted and difficult to interpret, even
for an experienced tax practitioner. Like many provisions of the
Code and regulations, some definitions and operational rules are
applicable to more than one classification rule.2

8

A general rule is

given, but as is true of many Code sections, the exceptions to this
general rule are the key. Some of the exceptions apply to all creditors, while others apply only to creditors who are also shareholders.
Therefore, in an attempt to make it easier for the reader to understand the regulations, and to prevent unnecessary redundancy, the
order of presentation in this article will differ from that of the
regulations.
The effective date and scope of the regulations will be discussed. 29 This will be followed by an examination of the definitions
of various terms which are used in more than one rule.3 0 Next, the
26. Beghe, supra note 24, at 933. But see Eustice, Corporations and Corporate Investors, 25 TAx L. REv. 509, 527 (1970) (section 385 delegates virtually unlimited authority to Secretary).
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1(a) (1), T.D. 7774, 1981-22 I.R.B. 6.

28. As used in this article, the term "operational, rule" will encompass
any test or rule used by a classification rule. "Classification rule" will mean
any provision which actually classifies an interest as debt or equity.
29. See notes 53-73 and accompanying text infra.
30. See notes 74-93 and accompanying text infra.
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operational rules that are applicable to more than one operational
or classification rule will be identified and evaluated.31 The general
rule for classification will be reviewed,32 followed by an enumeration
and discussion of the exceptions and modifications to the general
rule. 3 But, initially, the differences in the tax treatment of debt
and equity will be outlined*3 4 for one must know why classification
as debt or equity makes a difference in order to understand the
substance of the controversy.

1I.

THE EFFECTS OF CLASSIFICATION AS INDEBTEDNESS OR STOCK

There is a significant difference in the federal tax treatment of
payments made with respect to stock vis-a-vis payments made with
respect to indebtedness. For instance, although interest is included
in the gross income of the recipient under section 61,35 section 163
states: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or
accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness." 86 On the other
hand, amounts distributed to a shareholder by a corporation with
respect to its stock are also likely to be included in the shareholder's
gross income, 7 but no deduction will be allowed to the corporation.
The nondeductibility to the corporation of the distribution payments has the effect of substantially increasing the cost of obtaining
corporate equity capital.38
31. See notes 95-203 and accompanying text infra.
32. See notes 204-18 and accompanying text infra.
33. See notes 219-472 and accompanying text infra.
34. See notes 35-52 and accompanying text infra.
35. I.R.C. § 61(a)(4).
36. Id. § 163(a) (1976).
37. Such distributions will be included in ordinary income if they are a
dividend. Id. § 301(c)(1) (1978). Any distribution out of a corporation's earnings and profits will be considered a dividend. Id. § 316(a) (1978). Thus, distributions will be included in the gross income of the shareholders to the
extent of corporate earnings and profits. In general, this will result in interest
being taxed no more heavily than dividends to a non-corporate shareholder.
See Plumb, supra note 2, at 374.
38. Plumb, supra note 2, at 373. Plumb has described the impact of the
difference between a corporation's use of debt or stock in its capital structure
as follows:
In order to pay a $6 dividend on a share of preferred or common
stock, a corporation must earn approximately $12 before taxes,
whereas a bond bearing $6 interest can be carried with only $6 of
earnings. Thus, the leverage that results from the use of debt instruments . . . to obtain capital, which it is hoped will earn a return
for the common shareholders in excess of the fixed cost of carrying
such securities, is magnified when the tax deduction in effect cuts
that cost in half .... The small corporation, while its opportunities
for leverage may be limited by the unavailability of outside financing, nevertheless may profit by designating part of its stockholder's
interest as debt, thereby mitigating the "double taxation" of cor-
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From the viewpoint of the shareholder, the principal advantage
of debt over equity lies in the consequences of repayment of his
investment. If an interest is found to be indebtedness, repayment

of the investment will be a tax-free return of capital to the extent
of the shareholder's adjusted basis in the debt instrument.3 9 Furthermore, under section 1232, any amount received upon retirement
of an obligation will be considered as received in a sale or exchange, 40 and thus any gain realized will be capital gain as opposed
41
to ordinary income.
In contrast, if an interest is found to be equity, any amount received upon repayment will be an amount received in redemption
of the shareholder's stock.4 2 If the shareholder cannot pass the tests
of section 302(b), 43 which he will most likely be unable to do,
44
particularly if he is a shareholder of a closely-held corporation,
ordinary income will be the result.4 5

Thus, payments of principal

will be taxed as dividends if the investment is found to be equity,
thereby decreasing the shareholder's after-tax return.

If there is

any possibility that the debt-equity regulations may convert debt
into equity, a potential investor will probably demand a significantly
higher pre-tax return in order to be assured of the same return on
an after-tax basis. This will result in an increase in the cost of debt
capital to corporations. In some cases, the cost of debt capital may
tend to approach the cost of equity capital. Small corporations that
cannot justify this increase in the cost of capital will be unable to
obtain additional capital.
porate earnings through the payment of what amounts in substance
to deductible dividends.
Id.
39. See I.R.C. § 1232(a) (1978) (sale or exchange of debt instruments).
Under § 1001, upon a sale or exchange, gain is realized only to the extent
that the amount realized exceeds the adjusted basis. Id. § 1001(a) (1980).
40. Id. § 1232(a)(1) (1978).
41. Id. § 1232(a) (1978). In certain circumstances, a creditor may have
an adjusted basis in the debt instrument which is less than the face amount.
For example, the debt may have originated in a tax-free transfer of property to
a corporation under § 351, and thus will have a substituted basis under
§ 358(a)(1). See id. §§ 351 (1980), 358(a)(1) (1978).

42. Id. § 302(a) (1980).
43. Id. § 302(b) (1980).
44. Gerver, De-Emphasis of Debt-Equity Test for Thin Corporations Re-

quires New Defense Tactics, 23 J. TAx. 28, 28 (1965). The shareholder will
probably have to give up a large portion of his holdings and perhaps some
degree of control, and his family may also have to give up some holdings.
Id.

45. I.R.C. § 301 (c)(1) (1978). If the § 302(b) tests are not satisfied, the
rules of §§ 301 and 316 are applicable. Id. § 302(d) (1980). See note 37 and
accompanying text supra.
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Because of the potential impact upon a corporation's cost of

capital, it would appear that these regulations are destined to have a
significant impact upon the financing arrangements of all corporations. However, they seem to be particularly important with respect
to small, closely-held corporations, whose shareholders provide the
best, and often the only, source of financing. 40 This is particularly
true in the current economic environment in which high interest
rates and limited access to capital markets, caused by tight monetary
4
conditions, generally restrict borrowing by small corporations. 7
In addition to those set forth above, there are additional differences between the treatment of debt and equity interests. 48 Although the courts frequently must determine whether an investment
is debt or equity in order to classify a payment as a dividend or
interest,4 9 other issues which depend upon such a determination
include whether a bad debt deduction will be allowed 50 and whether
the corporation is insolvent.5 1 As a result, the regulations under
46. Gerver, supra note 44, at 28.
47. It was unclear under the proposed regulations whether the regulations would have any impact on shareholders' rights and duties outside the
tax law. For example, comments were made which expressed concern that
holders of purported debt, which was classified as stock under the regulations,
would be considered stockholders and thus would be subject to the non-tax
law liabilities which stockholders face. The drafters of the final regulations
recognized this problem and § 1.385-4(c) was amended to provide that debt
reclassified as stock would still "have the same terms . . . as the instrument
has under applicable local law." See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(c) (1980).
48. See Plumb, supra note 2, at 383-98. Other differences occur upon the
worthlessness of the investment, as a corporation liquidates, and upon the
death of a purported shareholder who wishes to utilize § 303 and have the
corporation redeem his stock. Id. at 371-404. See also Goldstein, Corporate
Indebtedness to Shareholders: "Thin Capitalization" and Related Problems,
16 TAX L. REv. 1 (1966).
49. See, e.g., Ragland Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 435 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1970);
Piedmont Materials Co., Inc. v. United States, 429 F.2d 560 (4th Cir. 1970); Litton
Business Sys., Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367 (1973); Family Group, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 660 (1973); Mennuto v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 910
(1971); Motel Corp. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1433 (1970).
50. See, e.g., Raymond v. United States, 511 F.2d 185 (6th Cir. 1975);
Midland Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 481 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1973); Dixie
Dairies Corp. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 476 (1980); Thompson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 878 (1980); Davis v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 814 (1978).
51. See Yale Ave. Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 1062 (1972). In Yale,
the issue of whether an advance was debt or equity determined whether the
corporation was insolvent. Id. at 1073. In a prior decision, the Tax Court
had entered a judgment against the corporate taxpayer. See id. at 1072. This
liability was later settled for a lesser amount, so that the taxpayer had income
from the discharge of indebtedness. Id. However, if the advance was a
loan, the corporation was insolvent both before and after the discharge, and
no income would result. Id. at 1073. On the other hand, if the advance
was a contribution to capital, the corporation would have been solvent,
with the result that there would be income. Id.
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section 385 are of vital importance in deciding the tax consequences
52
in many areas of tax law.

III. SCOPE OF THE REGULATIONS AND EFFECTIVE DATE

The regulations apply to all instruments, including preferred
stock, certain unwritten obligations, 53 and guaranteed loans, issued
or made after December 31, 1981.1 4

Other interests, such as bank

deposits, insurance policies, claims for wages, and trade accounts payable are outside the scope of the regulations. 5 Any interest that is
outside the scope of the regulations is to be treated as stock or indebtedness under applicable principles of existing case law without
reference to the regulations.58
It must be noted that these regulations will exert an influence
over broad areas of the Code. While they were issued under section
385, they will be effective for all purposes of the Internal Revenue
Code. 7 Thus, a section 385 determination may produce tax consequences affecting transactions addressed by many sections in all
parts of the Code.5 8
52. Recent court decisions illustrate this point. In Georgia-Pacific Corp.
v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 790 (1975), the taxpayer argued that stockholder
advances were contributions to capital rather than loans, and thus could
offset excess losses of the corporation in the computation of its affiliated group's
consolidated income. Id. at 795. Two other cases in which the debt versus
equity question dictated the result involved the issue of whether § 1244 stock
issued in return for cash advances was exchanged for an equity interest, in
which case the stock would not qualify as § 1244 stock. See Hollenbeck v.
Commissioner, 422 F.2d 2 (9th Cir. 1970); Smyers v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.
189 (1971).
The debt versus equity question can affect non-tax law as well. For example, in one case the focus was upon whether a taxpayer's deduction for a bad
debt was improper. This in turn determined whether a tax claim in a
bankruptcy proceeding was valid. See In re Uneco, Inc., 532 F.2d 1204 (8th
Cir. 1976). See also In re Indian Lakes Estates, Inc., 448 F.2d 574 (5th Cir.
1971) (trustee in bankruptcy challenged validity of priority tax claims on
basis that deficiency assessments disallowing interest deduction on purported
debt were improper).
53. Obligations which are described in §1.385-7(a) are subject to the
regulations. See note 326 and accompanying text infra.
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1(a)(1), T.D. 7774, 1981-22 I.R.B. 6.
An exception is made for instruments issued pursuant to a written contract which is binding on December 29, 1980 and at all times thereafter.
Id. § 1.385-1(a)(2)(ii). There is also an exception for instruments issued pursuant to a plan of reorganization in a bankruptcy proceeding. Id. § 1.385-1(a)
(2)(i). The Secretary has stated that the December 29, 1980 date would be
changed, but did not specify the amended date. See T.D. 7774, 1981-22 I.R.B. 6.
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1(b)(1) (1980).
56. Id.
57. See I.R.C. § 385(a).
58. These sections include id. §§ 165 (1971), 166 (1976), 243 (1976), 267
(1978), 269 (1976), 279 (1976), 302 (1980), 303 (1976), 304 (1964), 318 (1964), 332
(1976), 341 (1976), 351 (1980), 368 (1980), 482 (1976), 531, 542 (1980), 1239 (1980),
1372 (1978), 1504 (1980).
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It is hard to imagine that any corporation, public or closely
held, will be unaffected by these regulations since they encompass
all aspects of corporate financing except trade accounts payable and
similar items. Yet, there can be no doubt that their greatest effect
will be felt by small companies because some of the most significant
rules do not apply to public corporations. For example, the fair
market value rules of section 1.385-3(a) are not applicable to instruments registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission,5
and the proportionality rules of section 1.385-6 do not apply to instruments that are widely held and readily marketable, 0 nor to any
instrument held by an independent creditor.6' In addition, many
of the safe harbors provided by the regulations will protect the large
corporation to a greater degree than its smaller counterparts. 62 Perhaps more importantly, the regulations focus on instruments which
are issued to shareholders, with the result that instruments held by
non-shareholders generally will not be affected. 3 Thus, large corporations, which obtain most of their capital from outsiders, will be
largely unaffected by the regulations. However, small corporations
will generally be subject to the regulations. These smaller entities
depend heavily upon shareholder financing, both temporary and
long term, because they simply do not have the access to capital or
64
debt markets which larger companies enjoy.
It is ironic that, given the legislative history of section 385,
small business operations and closely-held corporations will face the
greatest burden in complying with the new regulations. It is clear
that Congress initially was concerned with the rapid increase in
mergers and consolidations in the late 1960's and, in particular, with
the use of securities such as subordinated and convertible debentures
in structuring such transactions.6 5 The grant of authority to prescribe regulations was not, however, limited to cases involving acquisitions,6 and the result is regulations which will be of concern primarily to closely-held corporations.
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(ii) (1980).
60. Id. § 1.385-6(a)(3)(i).
61. Id. § 1.385-6(a)(3)(ii).
62. See notes 103, 185-89, 9: 344-59 and accompanying text infra.
The non-shareholder instru63. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-5(a), -8(a) (1980).
ments which are subject to the regulations are hybrid instruments and locked
instruments. Id. See notes 223-56 & 257-63 and accompanying text infra.
64. See Gerver, supra note 44, at 28.
65. S. REP. No. 552, supra note 10, at 137-38. See note 10 supra.
66. The Senate Report notes that, in providing guidelines, the Secretary
was not to be limited to promulgating rules which would apply only in
the corporate acquisition context. S. REP. No. 552, supra note 10, at 138-39.
The Senate, where § 385 of the Code originated, wanted to authorize guidelines for distinguishing debt from equity in the "numerous situations other
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Obviously, closely-held corporations are not free from sin in
the debt-equity area. In fact, it is the smaller corporation whose
capitalization has generally been the subject of IRS attack under
the purely subjective standards of the past. Shareholder abuses,
including extreme cases of debt-equity relationships, are documented
in the case law.6 7 However, while arm's length dealings with one's
own corporation are desirable, such a goal is impractical and not
very realistic for most closely-held corporations. Section 385 was
enacted by Congress to provide the Secretary with the means of
promulgating regulations to help define certain interests in corporations as stock or indebtedness. It does not seem that the intent was
to provide a framework for rules so stringent that small business
corporations, which generally cannot resort to outside financing,
would be unduly penalized. Yet it may be argued that at least some
of the provisions in the regulations will have that result.6 8 If this
is the case, the Secretary should recognize the critical importance
which these regulations will take in the small business arena and
give special consideration to their effect on such businesses. Some
provisions should be added to exempt small corporations, similar
to the provisions of section 279 of the Code. 9 Also, it is suggested
that exemptions should be granted to newly-formed corporations for
a number of years after their formation. This is particularly true
since the economy of the nation significantly depends upon small
business. It is clear that Congress has recognized the important role
that small businesses play in our society. 70 For example, Congress
has stated that the economic well-being and security of the nation
"cannot be realized unless the actual and potential capacity of small
businesses is encouraged and developed." 71 More recently, laws
than those involving corporate acquisitions." Id. at 138. Presumably, these
other situations would include advances to closely-held corporations, but,
given the fact that the impetus for the delegation of authority by § 385 was
the use of debt in large corporate mergers, it can be argued that Congress
did not intend that large, public corporations should be virtually exempted
from the new regulations. See H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 101
(1969).
67. See, e.g., Tampa & G.C. R.R. Co. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1393
(1971), afl'd, 469 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1972) (no interest paid on "bonds" for
over 30 years); 250 Hudson St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 5 T.C.M. (CCH) 722
(1946) (debt-equity ratio of 150,000:1).
68. See notes 188-89, 289-91, 389, & 465-72 and accompanying text infra.
69. See I.R.C. § 279 (1976). Section 279(a)(1) has the practical effect of
exempting small corporations by restricting the application of § 279 to those
situations in which the interest paid or incurred on indebtedness related to
corporate acquisitions exceeds $5,000,000. Id. § 279(a)(1) (1976).
70. See S. REP. No. 878, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1976). This statement is part of the declaration of
policy underlying the Small Business Act, id. §§631-47,

which established

the Small Business Administration. See id. § 633.
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have been enacted that will encourage Federal agencies to structure
the regulations they issue in a manner which avoids any unnecessary
adverse effect on small businesses,72 and that amend federal laws so
that business enterprises, "particularly small, growing, and financially troubled enterprises, can . . . readily raise needed capital." 73
It follows that regulations which recognize the informality of the
closely-held corporation would not be inconsistent with federal
policy. In fact, since the accumulation of capital in the small business world is no easy task, consistency would favor rules creating
more freedom from taxation for the movement of funds between
shareholders and their closely-owned corporations.
IV.

DEFINITIONS APPLICABLE TO MORE THAN ONE
CLASSIFICATION RULE

The regulations specifically define several terms which are
applicable to more than one operational or classification rule within
the regulations. 74 Rather than redefine these terms each time they
appear in the regulations, these terms will be discussed here. However, since some of the definitions seem self-explanatory, 75 only those
which might confuse a taxpayer will be discussed here.
An "instrument" is "any bond, note, debenture, or similar
written evidence of an obligation." 76 Preferred stock may be
treated as an instrument under section 1.385-10(a) if its terms provide

for fixed payments in the nature of principal or interest.77 Apparently, the analysis with respect to preferred stock begins with a
determination of whether the stock is an instrument.7 8 If it is not
an instrument, then it is considered to be an equity interest. If it
is determined to be an instrument, then there must be an evaluation
under the section 385 regulations in order to determine whether the
79
preferred stock is to be classified as debt or equity.

72. See The Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No.
(1980). See generally S. REP. No. 878, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
73. See The Small Business Investment Incentive Act
96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980). See generally H.R. REP. No.

96-354, 94 Stat. 1164
(1980).
of 1980, Pub. L. No.
1341, 96th Cong., 2d

Sess. 19 (1980).
74. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.

75. The regulations' definitions of the terms "obligation," "hybrid instru-

ment," and "straight debt instrument" are straightforward and do not seem

to require explanation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(d), -3(f) (1980).
76. Id. § 1.385-3(c).
77. Id. § 1.385-10(a). For a discussion of what constitutes fixed payments
of principal or interest, see notes 85-93 and accompanying text infra.
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-10(a) (1980).
79. Id.
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The term "independent creditor" is not precisely defined. Section 1.385-6(b)(1) merely states that all relevant facts and circumstances must be taken into account in determining whether a creditor is independent.8 0 However, section 1.385-6(b)(2) provides a
safe harbor for making this determination."' Under this safe harbor
rule, a creditor is deemed to be independent if stock owned by the
corporation would not be attributed to the creditor under the constructive ownership rules of section 318(a) of the Code 82 as modified
by section 1.385-6(b)(3), 8 3 and if the creditor's holdings of stock and
instruments issued by the corporation are not substantially propor8 4

tionate.

A "fixed payment of interest" is defined as interest payable at a
definitely ascertainable rate and due on definitely ascertainable
dates, in which the holder's right to payment cannot be impaired
Likewise, a "fixed payment of principal" is
without his consent.
defined as a definitely ascertainable principal sum, payable on
demand or due on definitely ascertainable dates, in which the holder's right to receive the principal when due cannot be impaired
without his consent.80 A principal sum is definitely ascertainable if
it is either an invariable sum or a variable sum determined according to an external standard that is not subject to the borrower's
control and is not related to the success or failure of the borrower's
business.87 Furthermore, a principal sum is not variable simply
because it is within the borrower's control to prepay all or a portion
of the principal sum. 8 8

Similarly, a rate of interest is definitely

ascertainable if it is applied to a definitely ascertainable principal
sum, and is either an invariable rate or a variable rate determined
according to an external standard that is not subject to the borrow80. Id. § 1.385-6(b)(1). This would mean that factors such as the lender's relationship to the corporation and whether the lender had any loans

outstanding to the corporation should be considered. See generally, Hickman,
Incorporationand Capitalization: The Threat of the "Potential Income" Item
and a Sensible Approach to Problems of Thinness, 40 TAXES 974 (1962).

81. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(b)(2) (1980).
82. I.R.C. § 318(a) (1964).
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(b)(3) (1980).

In applying the § 318 attribution

rules in the context of determining whether one is an independent creditor,
the 50% threshold test contained in § 318 is deemed to require only a 5%
interest. Id. See I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(c), (a)(3)(c) (1964).
84. See notes 344-74 and accompanying text infra.

85. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(d)(2) (1980).
86. Id. § 1.385-5(d)(3). There 'are three minor exceptions to the requirement that the holder's rights cannot be impaired. See id. § 1.385-5(d)(5).
87. Id. § 1.385-5(d)(4)(ii).

88. Id.
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er's control and is not related to the success or failure of the borrower's business.89 A "contingent payment" is defined as any payment
other than a fixed payment of principal or interest. 90 Examples of
contingent payments include payments which are payable at the
discretion of the board of directors or are dependent upon the net
profit of the corporation. 9' However, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (Commissioner) may disregard a contingency where there
is no reasonably foreseeable circumstance in which the contingency
could affect the likelihood of payment. 92 In addition, if a payment
is not "fixed" under the requirements of the definitions stated above,
the Commissioner may treat the payment as fixed provided the payment is directly or indirectly guaranteed by any person.9 3
V.

OPERATIONAL RULES APPLICABLE TO MORE

THAN ONE CLASSIFICATION RULE

There are three operational rules which the Secretary has made
applicable to more than one classification rule. 94 These three rules
will be discussed in this section, and the classification rules to which
a specific operational rule is applicable will be identified.
A. Determination of the Fair Market Value of an Instrument
The determination of the fair market value of an instrument
is necessary in order to decide: 1) whether excessive or inadequate
consideration has been paid for an instrument under section 1.3853(a); 05 2) whether there has been a substantive change in the terms
of an instrument under section 1.385-60); 9 and 3) the proper classification of a hybrid instrument under section 1.385-5(a) when hold97
ings of stock and instruments are not substantially proportionate.
Section 1.385-3(b)(1)(i) provides, in general, that the fair market
value of an instrument is the price at which it would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, both having a reason89. Id. § 1.385-5(d)(4)(i). An example of an external standard which meets
these requirements is an interest rate which "floats" with the rise and fall
of the prime rate. Id. § 1.385-5(e), Example 10.
90. Id. § 1.385-5(d)(1).

91. Id. § 1.385-5(e), Example 2.
92. Id. § 1.385-5(d)(6). No example is given of when this rule would be
applied. Hopefully, the Commissioner will not expand this rule beyond
appropriate bounds.
93. Id. § 1.385-5(d)(7)(ii).

94. Sce note 28 and accompanying text supra.
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) (1980).

96. Id. § 1.385-60).
97. Id. § 1.385-5(a).
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able knowledge of all the relevant facts.9 8 In an attempt to add
some certainty, it is pointed out that the fair market value of an
instrument may be determined by using the present value and
standard bond tables of the section 1232 regulations. 99 Furthermore, two rules of convenience are provided. First, the fair market
value of a straight debt instrument on the day of its issue is assumed
to be equal to its face amount if the stated annual interest rate is
reasonable 100 and the consideration paid for the instrument is equal
to its face amount. 01' Second, the fair market value of an instrument on the day of its issue is the issue price, as defined in section
1232 of the Code,10 2 if the instrument is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and sold to the public for money. 10 3
In determining the fair market value of an instrument, the Commissioner may disregard a non-commercial term of the instrument
if the principal purpose of the inclusion of the term is to increase
04
or decrease the fair market value of the instrument.
B. Computation of the Debt-Equity Ratio
The determination of a corporation's debt-to-equity ratio is
necessary in order to decide: 1) whether a particular rate of interest
is reasonable under the rule of convenience described in section
1.385-6(e); '0r 2) whether a corporation has excessive debt for the
purpose of classification under section 1.385-6(f); 106 and 3) whether
a corporation has excessive debt for the purpose of classifying certain
07
other obligations as equity under section 1.385-7(b)(2).1
98. Id. § 1.385-3(b)(1)(i).

99. Id. § 1.385-3(b)(I)(ii).

See id. § 1.1232-3(b)(2)(ii)(d), T.D. 7663, 1980-1

C.B. 101.
100. Id. § 1.385-6(e). For a discussion of the analysis used to determine
whether an interest rate is reasonable, see notes 153-204 and accompanying
text infra.
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(i) (1980).
102. See I.R.C. § 1232(b)(2) (1976).
103. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(ii) (1980).
104. Id. § 1.385-3(b)(1)(iii)(A). The example given to illustrate this rule,
involving a debenture which provides that an action to enforce the debenture
can be maintained only in the "village court" of a foreign country, is too
extreme to be of any use. See id. § 1.385-3(b)(1)(iii)(B). Hopefully, this rule
will not be used in situations in which its use is not warranted, such as when
a shareholder's holdings of stock and debt are not proportionate and there is
an arm's length transaction. It may be argued that the regulations should
be amended to provide other examples to clarify this rule so that the Service
will not be able to expand its use beyond reasonable bounds.
105. Id. § 1.385.6(e).
106. Id. § 1.385-6(f).

107. Id. § 1.385-7(b)(2).
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In general, the debt-equity ratio is defined as the ratio of a
corporation's liabilities to its stockholders' equity.1 08 When computing the corporation's liabilities, trade accounts payable, accrued
operating expenses and taxes, and similar items are excluded. 10 9
Stockholders' equity is defined as the excess of the adjusted basis of
a corporation's assets over its liabilities without exclusion of any of
these liabilities." 0 The adjusted basis of a corporation's assets and
the amount of its liabilities are to be determined in accordance with
the tax accounting principles properly used by the corporation in
determining its taxable income and without regard to the classification of any interest as stock or indebtedness under the provisions of
section 385, except that preferred stock is considered a liability if it
is treated as indebtedness under the section 385 regulations."'
The use of the adjusted basis of the corporation's assets in computing shareholders' equity may be criticized on the basis that it is
inconsistent with the existing case law. In Liflans Corp. v. United
States,1 2 the Court of Claims stated that the "prevailing view seems
to be that assets are to be taken at fair market value rather than at
book value when valuing the equity interest in order to compute the
[debt-to-equity] ratio." "11 Tax Court opinions," 4 as well as appellate decisions, 15 have expressed a similar view, and the commentators seem to be in agreement that the fair market value of the
corporation's assets should be used." 8e Even the Secretary acknowledges that the fair market value of a corporation's assets is the
7
theoretically correct measure of equity."1
The position taken by the courts that the fair market value of
corporate assets yields a more correct measure of corporate equity
108.
109.
110.
does not

Id. § 1.385-6(g)(1).
Id. § 1.385-6(g)(1)(i).
Id. § 1.385-6(g)(2). For this purpose, the adjusted basis of the assets
include reserves for bad debts or similar asset offsets. Id.

111. Id. § 1.38 5- 6 (g)(3).
112. 390 F.2d 965 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
113. Id. at 970, quoting Goldstein, supra note 48, at 19.
114. See, e.g., Nye v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 203, 216 (1968); Swoby
Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 887, 893-96 (1947).
115. See, e.g., Estate of Miller v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 729, 733 (9th
Cir. 1956); Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118, 127 (2d Cir.
1956).
116. See, e.g., Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, 17
N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAX. 771, 779 (1959); Gerver, supra note 44, at 29; Goldstein, supra note 48, at 19; Holzman, supra note 7, at 4; Plumb, supra note
2, at 516; Spanbock, Carro, and Katz, Nourishing the Thin Corporation, 34
TAXES 687, 690 (1956).
117. See Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed.
Reg. 18,957, 18,959 (1980).
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than does adjusted basis follows from the courts' view of the essential
difference between a creditor and a stockholder. In essence, a stockholder intends to make an investment and takes the risk of loss in
order to share in the business' profits, if any, while a lender seeks a
definite obligation payable in any event.1 18 Thus, it is clear that the
assumption of risk plays a part in determining whether there is a
creditor or a shareholder relationship. In determining the degree
of risk, a prospective creditor is more concerned with the fair market
value of a potential borrower's assets than he is with the basis of the
assets because the creditor would want to know the extent to which a
business may suffer losses without adverse consequences to his interest. The use of any amount other than the fair market value of
the corporation's assets would be virtually meaningless with respect
to this issue.
It may also be argued that the use of adjusted basis results in
applying a financial accounting device reflecting historical cost to an
economic concept founded on value. Clearly, in today's inflationary
economy, adjusted basis is an inaccurate measure of capitalization
and it has no necessary correlation to economic reality. Rather,
adjusted basis is primarily a reflection of the past tax treatment of
assets. The Financial Accounting Standards Board has explicitly
recognized this in requiring public enterprises to reflect current
costs and values in financial reports. 119 The accounting community's
flexibility is in sharp contrast to the Secretary's position. It should
be noted that the certainty which the Secretary claims is promoted
by the use of adjusted basis rather than fair market value would also
exist if financial accounting carrying values were used to compute
stockholder's equity. More importantly, the regulations do not even
consider the effect of assets with no adjusted basis, such as goodwill. Clearly, this may substantially distort the equity portion of the
debt-equity ratio, particularly when a service business, trade name,
or patent is involved.
Having considered the shortcomings associated with the use of
adjusted tax basis as the asset carrying value when computing stockholder's equity, it is appropriate to consider the possible alternatives. The most promising alternatives include using the fair
market value of either the individual assets or the corporation's
outstanding stock, or the book value assigned to individual assets
for financial statement purposes.
118. See notes 3-4 and accompanying text supra.
119. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BoARD,
CIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

No. 33:

STATEMENT OF FINAN-

FINANCIAL REPORTING AND CHANGING PRICES

(Sept. 1979).
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First, if stockholders' equity is to be computed based upon fair
market value rather than adjusted basis, the question arises as to
whether equity is to be determined by using the sum of the fair
market values of individual assets less the liabilities, or whether
equity is to be equal to the fair market value of a corporation's
outstanding stock' 20 For many corporations, it is much easier to
determine the fair market value of their assets than to determine
the value of their outstanding stock. It is generally recognized that
one of the most difficult appraisal exercises is to estimate the value
of closely-held stock which is seldom, if ever, traded in arm's length
transactions. 121 Therefore, it may be argued that corporations
issuing instruments should be provided with an option under which
the ratio could be computed using either measure of equity.
Second, both adjusted basis and fair market value figures may
be difficult to obtain, particularly for corporations which are members of affiliated groups 122 and have to make the difficult calculations
required by section 1.385-6(h) of the regulations 123 and section 279
of the Code. 12 Thus, it may be argued that the corporation should
have the option to compute equity by using the amounts appearing
in year end certified financial statements as the asset carrying values.
There are several arguments in favor of such an approach. Such
figures would be readily available, and such an election would
provide a corporation with the option of avoiding the burden of
duplicate records. It may also be pointed out that the use of the
adjusted tax basis of assets will create significant variations among
taxpayers in similar economic circumstances since different tax
elections and tax accounting methods may be adopted by different
taxpayers. It is suggested that the use of book values, based upon
generally accepted accounting principles, would tend to produce
more uniformity among taxpayers. In addition, it is more equitable
and practical to determine asset carrying values on the basis of a
corporation's financial statements since credit is ordinarily extended
on the basis of certified financial statements rather than tax returns.
Finally, the Secretary states that the particular ratios selected in the
rules requiring the determination of a debt-equity ratio were de-

120. The Proposed Regulations used this latter approach as an alternate
test. See Prop. Reg. § 1.385-8(a)(2).
121. See generally G. MCCARTHY & R. HEALY, VALUING A COMPANY (1971);
Krahmer & Henderer, Valuation of Shares of Closely Held Corporations, 221
TAX MNGM'T PORTFOLIO (BNA) (1973).

122. See I.R.C. § 1504(a) (1980).
123. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(h) (1980).
124. See I.R.C. § 279(g) (1976).
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rived from extensive statistical analysis.123 Presumably, this analysis
was performed upon the balance sheet data contained in corporate
tax returns. It must be observed, however, that the balance sheets
set forth on corporate income tax returns are prepared on the basis
of generally accepted accounting principles; therefore, such data
does not reflect the adjusted tax basis of a corporation's assets. It
follows that the use of adjusted tax basis to determine the asset
carrying values used in computing the debt-equity ratio would
appear to be inappropriate since the ratio "norms" have been derived from a data base involving primarily generally accepted
accounting principles which are then applied to a data base derived
entirely by applying another set of accounting principles, tax elec126
tions, and tax methods of accounting.
Only one exception is provided by the regulations to the use
of adjusted tax basis of assets in computing the generally applicable
debt-equity ratio. 127 This exception permits a cash method corporation to use the face amount of trade accounts receivable, less
an appropriate reserve for uncollectibles, as the adjusted basis of the
receivables. 128 Thus, only in the case of trade accounts receivable
is the fair market value of the assets to be used. Yet, the arguments
presented above support the proposition that all four of the possible
methods to compute equity should be available to a corporate taxpayer.12 9 That is, section 1.38 5-6(g) 130 should permit a corporation,
at its election, to compute stockholders' equity on the basis of
1) data contained in certified year-end financial statements; 2) the
fair market value of its outstanding stock on the day the instruments
in question were issued; 3) the fair market value of individual
assets; or 4) the adjusted tax basis of its assets. Clearly, if a fair
market value approach is selected, it would be appropriate for the
corporation to carry the burden of proof as to the values used.
However, if the valuation process is too expensive or uncertain, it
seems reasonable to allow the company the option of using more
objective and readily obtainable data such as the adjusted tax basis
of assets or their values for purposes of certified financial statements.
Allowing these alternatives would be consistent with the policy of
allowing a corporation to "avoid the negative implications of a
125. See Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg.
18,957, 18,962 (1980).
126. See note 187 and accompanying text infra.
127. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(5)(i) (1980).
128. Id.
129. See notes 120-26 and accompanying text supra.
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g) (1980).
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high debt-to-equity ratio by establishing that it is, in fact, adequately
capitalized."

131

Having addressed the issues associated with the determination
of asset carrying values, it is necessary to consider the amounts that
are included in computing liabilities. Throughout recent accounting history, the equity section of the balance sheet has represented
the residual obtained when liabilities are subtracted from the carrying value of assets. Accordingly, liabilities are subtracted from the
adjusted basis of the assets in order to determine stockholders' equity
under section 1.3 8 5 -6(g)(2).13 2 For this purpose, trade accounts
payable, accrued operating expenses and taxes, and other similar
items are included in the term "liabilities." 133 However, when the
debt-equity ratio is computed, by comparing liabilities with stockholders' equity, these items are excluded from the term "liabilities." 134 Therefore, it is appropriate to address two questions.
First, what is the general concept of liabilities, since that term is
not defined in the regulations? In addition, it is appropriate to
inquire as to what constitutes trade accounts payable, accrued operating expenses and taxes, and other similar items.
In financial accounting, liabilities include all items which represent a sum certain due to another person or legal entity on some
date, as well as amounts collected in advance for services to be
rendered in the future or goods to be delivered in the future, estimates of amounts that may be due under contingencies, prepayments
tinder construction contracts, deferred income taxes, deferred income items, 13 5 and any other similar item that represents an obligation of a particular enterprise to transfer economic resources to
other entities in the future as a result of a past transaction or event
affecting the enterprise. 18 The uncertainty of the scope of the
term "liabilities," as used in section 1.3 8 5 -6 (g), occurs with respect
to these latter items. 13 7 Additional guidance is needed with respect
131. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg.

18,957, 18,958 (1980).

132. Treas. Reg. § 1.385- 6 (g)(2) (1980).
133. Id. § 1.385-6(g)(2)(ii).

134. Id. § 1.385-6(g)(1) (i).
135. Under generally accepted accounting principles, deferred income items
would not be considered to be liabilities although they would be so treated
under certain tax accounting principles.
136. See

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, OBJEcrIVES OF FINANCIAL

REPORTING AND ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES,
PROPOSED STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS
49 (1977). See
also D. KIESO & J. WEYGANDT, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 428-29 (3d ed. 1980).

137. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g) (1980).
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to which of these items are liabilities for purposes of the debt-equity
ratio computation. One possible solution would be to specify in
the regulations that only "instruments," "obligations," and "certain other obligations," as defined in the regulations, 138 would be
considered liabilities.
The scope of the term "liabilities" is affected by "trade accounts payable," "accrued operating expenses," and "other similar
items" as these terms are defined in the regulations. It is stated
that such items are accorded special treatment because they vary
widely during the year, and, if these items were included in the
liabilities, "one of the principal purposes of the regulations, which
is to provide a high degree of certainty for corporations" would be
defeated.8 9 Although the final regulations attempt to clarify when
an item will be treated in the same manner as trade accounts payable, 14 0 it may be argued that the goal of certainty will not be
attained unless the term "other similar items" is interpreted as
encompassing all the additional categories of items which do not
represent liabilities for money borrowed, liabilities for fixed assets
purchased or leased, or pension liabilities. Under the final regulations, it appears that, in order for a liability to be treated in the
same manner as a trade account payable, it must have been incurred
for the purchase of an item of inventory.' 4 ' It is suggested that
this provision is too restrictive, and should be broadened.
For purposes of determining the debt-equity ratio, a corporation's liabilities are to be determined without regard to whether
any interest is treated as stock or indebtedness under section 385.142
Because the regulations refer to any interest, and not to just the
instrument in question, it appears that, if a certain debt instrument
has previously been reclassified as stock under the regulations, it
will still be debt for the computation of the debt-equity ratios.
This is illogical, and contrary to other provisions of the regulations.148 For instance, section 1.38 5 -4(c)(1) provides that an instrument classified as stock under section 385 shall be preferred stock
for all purposes of the Code. 44 Section 1.385-4(b) provides that the
status of an instrument is determined as of the time of its issuance,
138. See id. §§ 1.385-3 (c), -3 (d), -6 (a).
139. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg.

18,957, 18,959 (1980).
140. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(5)(v) (1980).
141. See id.
142. Id. § 1.385-6(g)(3)(ii).

143. See notes 144-47 and accompanying text infra.
144. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(c)(1) (1980).
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and, once determined to be stock, its status can never change. 145
More importantly, the required treatment appears inconsistent with
section 385(a), which applies the section 385 classification for all
purposes of the Code. 40 The Secretary states that the reason for
this rule is that a liability's effect on a corporation's financial stability is largely independent of its treatment for tax purposes. 47 However, it is fundamentally unfair to treat an instrument as equity for
all other tax purposes but as a liability for purposes of applying the
debt-equity ratio to determine the classification of another instrument.
C. Determination of a Reasonable Rate of Interest
Determining what constitutes a reasonable rate of interest is
necessary in order to decide: 1) whether the rule of convenience
stated in section 1.385-3(b)(2)(i) may be used for determining the
fair market value of an instrument; 148 2) whether an instrument
issued for property other than money is to be classified as stock or
debt under section 1.385-6(d); .49 3) whether a demand instrument
is to be classified as stock or debt under section 1.385-6(l)(1);

"50

4)

whether a demand instrument that has been classified as debt is to
be reclassified as stock under section 1.385-6(l)(2), 1, and 5) whether
certain other obligations, as defined in section 1.385-7(a), that have
been classified as debt must be reclassified as stock under section
1.385-7(c)(1). 15 2 This determination is the primary factor for ascertaining whether the terms of an instrument conform to the arm's
length standards in each of the above classification rules. Conformity with the arm's length standards is required in order for an
instrument to be classified as debt under these provisions.
Given this state of affairs, it may be argued that such an emphasis upon a reasonable rate of interest is inconsistent with existing
case law. This argument is supported by the fact that the courts
clearly recognize that no one factor is controlling,5 and that the
lack of a reasonable interest rate alone could not be given as the
145. Id. § 1.385-4(b).
146. I.R.C. § 385(a).
147. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg.
18,957, 18,959 (1980).
148. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(i) (1980).
149. Id. § 1.385-6(d).
150. Id. § 1.385-6()(1).
151. Id. § 1.385-6(/)(2).
152. Id. § 1.385-7(a), -7(c)(1).
153. See note 8 supra and authorities cited therein.
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reason for characterizing an. interest as equity rather than debt. 54
In addition, section 385(b) appears to make it clear that Congress
intended to leave the Secretary a "blank check" to set forth factors
to distinguish between debt and equity instruments.1 55 However,
in attempting to regulate interest rates under section 1.385-6(e), the
Secretary appears, in substance, to be legislating valuation. 156 It is
not clear that this factor aids in distinguishing debtor-creditor relationships from corporation-shareholder relationships, which is the
task that was delegated to the Secretary by Congress in section 385.117
Therefore, it may also be argued that section 1.385-6(e) exceeds the
Secretary's grant of authority under section 385.
Under the regulations, a stated annual rate of interest is reasonable if it is comparable to the range of rates paid to independent
creditors on similar instruments by corporations in the same general
industry, geographic location, and financial condition on the date
the determination is made. 5 8 In addition, a safe harbor alternative
is offered so that corporations can avoid the uncertainty of the general definition. 5 9 The stated :rate of interest is presumed to be
reasonable if two conditions are satisfied. First, on the date the
determination is made, the stated rate must be equal to the rate in
effect under section 6621,160 the prime rate in effect at any local
commercial bank,1 6 or a rate determined from time to time by the
Secretary, taking into consideration the average yield on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States of comparable
maturity. 162 Alternatively, the rate may fall between any two of
154. See Gordon Lubricating Co. v. Commissioner. 24 T.C.M. (CCH)
697, 710 (1965); Curry v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 667, 692 (1963).
155. See I.R.C. §385(b). The legislative history also makes this clear.
See S. REP. No. 552, supra note 10, at 138.
156. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e) (1980).

157. I.R.C. § 385.
158. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(l) (1980).
159. Id. § 1.385-6(e)(2).
160. I.R.C. §6621(b)(1979). Under §6621(b), the Secretary may adjust
the interest rate in October of every second year based on the adjusted prime rate
charged by banks during the preceding September. Id. The adjusted prime
rate is 90% of the average predominant prime rate quoted by banks to large
businesses, as determined by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6621-1 (1980). In 1980, for example, the § 6621
interest rate was 12%. See Rev. Rul. 79-366, 1979-2 C.B. 402.
161. The term "local commercial bank" includes any commercial bank
at which the issuing corporation ordinarily does business. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6

(e)(4) (1980).

162. The Service plans to announce this rate by issuing a Revenue Procedure. See T.D. 7747, 1981-8 I.R.B. 15.
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the three rates described above. 163 Second, at the end of the taxable
year in which the determination is made, the debt-equity ratio 104
of the issuing corporation must not be greater than 1: 1.165
It is difficult to ascertain exactly what the general rule requires.'0 0 Read literally, it would be necessary for a corporation
to find other corporations which have issued similar instruments
and which are in the same general industry, geographic location, and
financial condition. 0 7 Such a determination would seem to be extremely difficult and, in some cases, impossible to make. For example, a determination of financial condition would necessarily include
an examination of the corporation's earnings history. Since a new
corporation would have no earnings history, it would be difficult to
find a corporation in similar financial condition which also qualifies
with respect to geographic location and the other factors mentioned.
There is certainly no indication in the regulations that the rule is
to be interpreted any way but literally. On the other hand, the
drafters point out that only in rare cases would a corporation borrow
money from its shareholders rather than from an independent creditor.1 68 The implication is that evidence of a quotation from a bank
or similar lending institution to the corporation will be a sufficient
benchmark to meet the requirements of the general rule. If this is
a correct interpretation of the Secretary's intent with respect to the
general rule, some examples should be added to illustrate the point.
Those examples should also emphasize what evidence is required
and state how such evidence could be obtained. Otherwise, the
list of factors in the general rule seems to be so broad and indefinite
that very little certainty results, with very little useful guidance
being provided to either taxpayers or the Service.
Perhaps the general rule is intended to codify existing case law
with respect to a reasonable rate of interest. If this assertion is
correct, the result will still be uncertain since the courts recognize
that no one factor is controlling. 69 In other words, a collection and
comparison of interest rates from existing case law would not be
163. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(2)(i) (1980). This provision requires that an
interest rate must be equal to or within the range of the three rates identified
therein; therefore, an interest rate will not be considered reasonable under the
rule of convenience if it is too high or too low. Id.
164. For a definition of the debt-equity ratio, see id. § 1.38 5-6(g). See
also notes 108-47 and accompanying text supra.
165. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(2)(ii) (1980).
166. See id. § 1.385-6(a)(1).
167. Id.
168. See T.D. 7747, 1981-8 I.R.B. 15.
169. See note 8 supra and authorities cited therein.
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informative because the courts also considered other factors when
deciding whether an instrument described in a particular case was to
be classified as debt or equity. It follows that no definite conclusions can be drawn concerning the reasonableness of any specific
interest rate described in a case. 170
In light of these shortcomings, it is suggested that the general
rule for reasonableness under section 1.385-6(e)(1) should be reconsidered.' 7 ' Clearly, what is needed is a rule that provides both
flexibility and certainty.
Unfortunately, the rule of convenience may have as many, if
not more, shortcomings than the general rule. These shortcomings
involve the use of the debt-equity ratio in the rule of convenience.
Even if an instrument's interest rate satisfies the conditions of the
rule of convenience, 172 a stated interest rate will still fail to qualify
as reasonable under the safe harbor if the debt-equity ratio of the
issuing corporation exceeds 1:1.173

Given the confusion which

would result from including a debt-equity test in the rule of convenience for a reasonable interest rate, it is very difficult to understand what purpose is served by adding such a requirement. It is
true that this is one of the five factors specifically enumerated by
Congress in section 385 for consideration in drafting the proposals.1 74 However, great reliance upon a corporation's debt-equity
ratio as a means of classifying an instrument should not serve to
obscure the central issue in existing case law, which is whether the
parties intended to create a bona fide debt at the time that an instrument was issued. 7 5 Apparently, the Secretary is treating the
debt-equity ratio as a measure of risk,178 and feels that a 1:1 ratio is
appropriate given the mechanics of the interest rate test specified in
170. See Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1081 (1957). In Gooding, the court merely
listed the cases which had dealt with the debt-equity problem and stated that,
because each case was decided on the basis of its own particular facts, "no
good purpose would be served by entering upon a review of the decided
cases." 236 F.2d at 165. See also Campbell v. Carter Foundation Prod. Co..
322 F.2d 827, 832 (5th Cir. 1963).
171. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(1) (1980).
172. See notes 159-65 and accompanying text supra.
173. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(2)(ii) (1980).
174. See I.R.C. § 385(b)(3).
175. See Aarons, Debt vs. Equity: Special Hazards in Setting Up the Corporate Structure, 23 J. TAX. 194, 194 (1965).
176. The debt-equity ratio has been described as a measure of risk in that
the "greater the capital and lower the debt, the less subject will the corporation be to the strain and pressure of financial crises, and the better able
to withstand financial setbacks." Spanbock, Carro, & Katz, supra note 116

at 688-89.
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the rule of convenience. 177 However, the corporate debt-equity
ratio is but one indication of risk, 17 and, even if the need for such
a measure is conceded, serious questions may be raised as to the
appropriateness of the particular test chosen.
First, the elevation of the debt-equity ratio test to a position of
such great importance in the rule of convenience is not consistent
with current case law. Although there once was a period in which
1 79
it
the. ratio test was the primary factor considered by the courts,

no longer commands this respect. The ratio is but one factor used
by the courts to distinguish debt from equity,' and no single factor
is controlling.'8 Thus, it would seem that placing so much emphasis on the relative amounts of debt and equity of a corporation is
182
inconsistent with judicial precedent.
177. Because the safe harbor interest rates were criticized as too low and
below market rates, the drafters of the regulations did not feel it necessary
to raise the ratio required above 1:1. In addition, the drafters state that
the failure to meet the safe harbor test means only that the corporation must
prove that the interest rate was reasonable under the general rule of Treas.
Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(1) (1980). See T.D. 7747, 1981-8 I.R.B. 15. Of course, this
would mean that the certainty which is the aim of the regulations would be
sacrificed.
178. Two commentators have recently employed the techniques of factor
analysis and multiple discriminant analysis to study judicial decisions on the
classification of debt versus equity in closely-held corporations. See Whittington
& Whittenburg, Judicial Classification of Debt versus Equity-An Empirical
Study, 55 ACCOUNTING REv. 409 (1980). One conclusion is that the courts
have placed great significance on the financial condition of the corporation at
the time when the instrument was issued. Id. at 415. However, financial
condition was evaluated by considering the availability of external financing,
the absence of contingent payments, the business purpose for debt creation,
and regular dividend payments, in addition to the ratio of debt to equity.
Moreover, except for regular dividend payments, these other factors seem to
be just as significant as the debt-equity ratio. See id. In addition, standard
finance textbooks frequently caution readers against becoming overly enamored
with a single measure of a company's ability to weather times of stress and
meet its obligations. It is noted that a number of measures such as the
current ratio, the acid test ratio, the total debt to total asset ratio, the longterm debt capitalization ratio, the total debt to total equity ratio, and the
times interest earned ratio, when taken together and interpreted in light of
competent professional judgment, will "supply some insight into the relative
size of the cushion of ownership funds creditors can rely upon" to absorb the

results of any financial setbacks.

E.

HELFERT,

TECHNIQUES

OF FINANCIAL

58-62 (1967). See also J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, ESSENTIALS OF
MANAGERIAL FINANcE 63-64 (3d ed. 1974).
179. See Caplin, supra note 116, at 778; Dixon, supra note 5, at 1269;
Plumb, supra note 2, at 507-08.
180. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 526 (1946). See
also Plumb, supra note 2, at 512. The Service acknowledges that the ratio is
but one factor to be considered. See Rev. Rul. 77-437, 1977-2 C.B. 28; Rev.
Rul. 68-54, 1968-1 CB. 69,
181. See note 8 supra.
182. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(1) (1980). Admittedly, if a corporation
cannot meet the 1:1 test, only the rule of convenience is not available to it.
The interest rate can still be shown to be reasonable under the general rule
ANALYSIS
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Second, a single ratio made applicable to all corporate entities
fails to consider the capital intensity of the business in which the
issuing corporation is engaged. 18 3 In certain types of businesses,
there is a need for large investments in machinery and equipment,
which may be financed by debt when demand for the output is
relatively definite. 4 It seems particularly harsh to require these
companies to either maintain a specified debt-equity ratio or find
the rule of convenience with respect to a reasonable interest rate
unavailable, when the economics of the particular industry will
support a higher leverage.
Third, the clear disregard for giving consideration to the capital
intensity of specific industries is aggravated by the fact that the test
specified is such a conservative debt-equity ratio. The drafters of
section 1.385-6(e) stated:
The ratio of 1:1 in Section 1.385-6(e) was chosen for two
reasons. First, it covers a majority of all corporations.
Extensive statistical analysis indicates that more than fiftyfive percent of all corporations filing tax returns in a recent
year and more than sixty percent of all new corporations
had debt to equity ratios of less than 1:1. Second, a debt to
equity ratio of 1:1 is exceptionally high by the standard of
public corporations. 18 5
It is not clear where the Treasury obtained the data for this analysis.
Balance sheets filed as part of a corporate income tax return (Form
1120) are financial accounting balance sheets, but section 1.385-6(g)
requires the use of the adjusted tax basis of a corporation's assets
rather than financial book value to compute the debt-equity ratio. 18
of § 1.385-6(e)(1). However, this would place a great strain on a corporation to establish that the interest rate charged by lenders to similar corporations is not materially different from the interest rate in question. It can
thus be argued that there is too much emphasis on the debt-equity ratio
test.
183. The ratio test was developed as an analytical tool for use in the context of a particular industry and a given business, rather than for use as an
"arbitrary standard." Spanbock, Carro, &:Katz, supra note 116, at 689. See
also Bittker, Thin Capitalization: Some Current Questions, 34 TAx.s 830,
831 (1956) (what is excessive debt for one industry may be normal for another).
184. Many of the cases which helped elevate the debt-equity ratio test to
its former position of primary importance involved corporations which owned
or operated real estate. The working capital needs of such corporations are
generally less stringent than those of many other types of corporations. Spanbock, Carro, & Katz, supra note 116, at 689. See Scotland Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 265, 273 (1965) (expert testimony received as to
whether company was adequately capitalized by industry standards).
185. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg.
18,957, 18,961 (1980).
186. See note 110 and accompanying text supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss1/2

28

Boyles and Rush: The Regulations under Section 385: A Review, Evaluation, and Sugg
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 27: p. 52

Thus, the ratio settled upon by the Secretary was determined by
using a data base different from the one used by taxpayers in computing their ratios under the regulations. 8 7 Moreover, even if the
statistical analysis is valid, a finding that forty-five percent of all
corporations filing tax returns failed to meet the 1:1 test shows that
the rule of convenience is not very convenient in that it will create
financing problems for a large portion of corporate taxpayers.
In addition, while it may be true that a debt-equity ratio of 1:1
is exceptionally high by the standards of public corporations (although by the Secretary's own analysis this statement is questionable), this may not be true in the case of smaller corporations.
Given the fact that smaller corporations are more in need of the
safe harbor and will enjoy the greatest benefit if the regulations
achieve their stated goals of providing greater certainty, lower compliance cost, and greater administrative efficiency,188 it is ironic
that the Secretary apparently intends to standardize the financing of
corporations without adequately taking into account the legitimate
methods of financing which are widely used by smaller corporations. Since smaller corporations have great difficulty in obtaining
access to the equity markets in order to meet their capital needs, 8 9
they have been forced to rely more heavily on debt than equity to
meet their needs. This great reliance on debt makes it unlikely
that the small corporation would typically have a 1:1 debt-equity
ratio. For example, if a corporation owns its own building subject
to a mortgage, as is typically the case, it is not likely to qualify.
Therefore, it is suggested that a standard which appears to be adequate only to large corporations is too conservative to achieve the
stated objectives of the regulations.
Furthermore, examination of the existing case
law clearly
shows that the courts have not required such conservative ratios 190
even though the debt-equity ratio has generally been computed
using the fair market values of assets rather than adjusted basis.' 0 '
While the ratio is but one factor to consider, 192 a corporation with
187. See notes 125-26 and accompanying text supra.
188. See notes 59-73 and accompanying text supra.
189. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
190. See, e.g., Liflans Corp. v. United States, 390 F.2d 965, 970 (Ct. Cl.
1968) (17:1); Sun Properties, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.2d 171, 175 (5th
Cir. 1955) (310:1); Baker Commodities v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 374, 396
n.20 (1967) (692:1); Curry v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 667 (1965) (30:1); J. I.
Morgan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 881 (1958) (50:1).
191. The use of fair market value would generally result in a ratio higher
than that which would result from the use of the adjusted basis. See notes
406-09 and accompanying text infra.
192. See note 180 and accompanying text supra,
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a relatively conservative ratio of between 3:1 and 5:1 193 should be
able to meet the rule of convenience. If not, then the rule of convenience is too narrowly drafted and will not relieve the courts, taxpayers, or the Service of the many disputes which will arise when
the only resort is to the subjective factors of the general rule.- In
other words, section 1.385-6(e)(2) appears to be, for all practical
purposes, meaningless as an objective rule of convenience because
of the debt-equity ratio requirement.
Fourth, it must again be pointed out that the courts have used

1 94
the fair market value of assets in determining debt-equity ratios.

In the current inflationary environment, the use of adjusted tax
basis is unlikely to provide a very accurate measure of leverage. The
use of adjusted basis will no doubt result in a less controversial
calculation, but, with the safe harbor ratio pegged at a very conservative 1:1, the regulations will fail to achieve their purpose of a
"high degree of certainty." 1'5 This is so because many corporations
will be forced into the more subjective general rule.
The simplest solution to the shortcomings indicated with respect to the presence of a debt-equity ratio test in the rule of convenience is to eliminate the ratio requirement altogether.
Alternatively, a higher ratio may be adopted. The courts have
allowed interest deductions in cases where the debt-equity ratio was
well in excess of 1: 1.196 In 1957, an Advisory Group on Subchapter
C, appointed by the House Ways and Means Committee, examined
the debt-equity problems and recommended a 5:1 safe harbor.' 97
There do not appear to be any fundamental economic, legal, or
accounting changes which have occurred during the intervening
time span in the area of corporate financing that would make the
recommendation less valid today. The Service has accepted a
20:1 ratio, as long as capital is sufficient for normal business operations. 9 8 Congress, in enacting section 279,199 initially considered
a 4:1 debt-equity ratio 200 before finally agreeing on a 2:1 compro193. See notes 196-204 and accompanying text infra.
194. See notes 113-18 and accompanying text supra.
195. See note 139 and accompanying text supra.
196. See note 190 supra.
197. Hearings on Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapters C,
J, and K of the Internal Revenue Code Before the House Committee on Ways
and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 579 (1959).

198. See Rev. Rul. 68-54, 1968-1 C.B. 69.
199. I.R.C. § 279 (1976).
200. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 140 (1969).

It must be noted
that the legislative history indicates that the Secretary, in developing the § 385
regulations, was not to be limited by the specific rules for distinguishing debt
from equity in the corporate acquisition context of § 279. Id. at 138-39.
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mise.2 ° ' Finally, it is no secret that tax practitioners have, for a.
number of years, worked under a rule of thumb that a debt-equity
ratio of 3:1 was unlikely to invite challenge.2 0 2 Therefore, the
use of a ratio of between 3:1 and 5:1 in the rule of convenience
would seem to generate the greatest support.2 °
VI.

THE GENERAL RULE FOR CLASSIFICATION

Section 1.385-4(a) sets forth the general rule that all instru24
ments are treated as indebtedness for all purposes of the Code.
Where there is a general rule, there are, of course, exceptions to the
rule. If an instrument is classified as stock under one of the exceptions, it is treated as preferred stock for all purposes of the Code.20°5
The status of an instrument as stock or indebtedness is to be determined as of the time the instrument is issued, and that status ordinarily will never change. 20 6 However, debt instruments held substantially proportionately to holdings of stock may be reclassified
as stock under certain circumstances.20 T If an instrument becomes
stock under any of these provisions, the instrument is treated as
having been exchanged for preferred stock in a tax-free recapitaliza20°
tion under section 368(a)(1)(E).
It is not clear why an instrument that is to be classified as stock
must be preferred stock rather than common stock. Such treatment
could result in the preferred stock being treated as section 306 stock,
which could bring that provision's rules of income characterization
201. See I.R.C. § 279(b)(4)(A) (1976). This section resolves the question
of whether corporate payments are deductible as an interest expense in the limited context of corporate acquisitions. It was considered by the Senate as a
companion to § 385 of the Code. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 144

(1969).

202. See B. BITrKER
PORATIONS

AND

& J.

SHAREHOLDERS

EUSTICE, FEDERAL

4.04(2) (4th ed.

INCOME TAXATION

1979);

OF COR-

Caplin, supra note

116, at 783; Plumb, supra note 2, at 508.
203. Because of the low range of interest rates allowed by the rule of
convenience, a conservative ratio of 3:1 to 5:1 is proper. Such a low ratio
is not as acceptable, however, in the context of the nominal capital rule of
§ 1.385-6(f). See notes 404-13 and accompanying text infra.
Another alternative would be to apply one ratio to publicly-held corporations and a higher ratio to closely-held corporations, with real estate holdings
and consequent liabilities excluded from the calculation of the ratio of the
small corporations.
204. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(a) (1980).
205. Id. § 1.385-4(c)(1).
206. Id. § 1.385-4(b)(1).
207. Id. §§ 1.385-4(b)(2), -6(j), -6(k), -6(o. See notes 440-72 and accompanying text infra.
208. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(c)(1)(ii) (1980). See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(E) (1980).
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into play.2 9 Moreover, under present law, the creation of preferred
stock may cause the corporation's original stock to fail to qualify
under section 1244.210 Such treatment may also have an unintended
impact in such areas as multiple tax benefits, consolidated return
eligibility, and the tax-free liquidations of subsidiaries. These potential problems could possibly be eliminated if the regulations
deemed the preferred stock to be non-voting stock which is limited
and preferred as to dividends, within the meaning of sections 1563
(c)(1)(A), 1504(a), and 332(b)(1). 211

Finally, the classification into

preferred stock for all purposes of the Code may be interpreted as
the creation of a second class of stock, which would invalidate a
2
Subchapter S election.

12

The issue of whether the reclassification of debt as preferred
stock creates a second class of stock which terminates a Subchapter
S election has been reserved by the Secretary. 213 The specific references to the issue of reclassification of stock in a Subchapter S
corporation which were contained in section 1.1371-1(g) have been
deleted.2 14 This issue is reserved because Congress is in the process
of reviewing the Subchapter S election, including the one class of
stock requirement. The Secretary recommends that the Subchapter
S rules allow a second class of stock in certain cases:
Although the Joint Committee Staff has recommended no
statutory change in this regard, we think that under the
present state of the law a change is necessary. A rational
regulatory scheme under section 385 should apply the debtequity classification throughout the Code, including the
status of securities issued by Subchapter S corporations.
But, as the case law suggests, the loss of Subchapter S
qualification is often a harsh result when a corporation
issues nominal debt that is treated as equity under section
385. It is a result that flows from the current Subchapter
S requirement of section 1371(a)(4): it should not be a
Therefore,
classification problem under section 385.
the problem should not be solved by overriding the rules
of section 385. Rather, the solution is to change the Sub209. I.R.C. § 306 (1980). Under § 306(a), a subsequent sale or redemption
of § 306 stock, as defined by § 306(c), may result in a portion of the gain
being characterized as ordinary income. Id.
210. Id. § 1244 (1980).
211. Id. §§ 332(b)(1) (1980), 1504(a) (1980), 1563(c)(1)(A) (1980).
212. In order for a corporation to be eligible for the Subchapter S election, the corporation is permitted to have only one class of stock. Id. § 1371(a)
(4) (1978).

213. See 45 Fed. Reg. 18,953 (1980). See also T.D. 7747, 1981-8 I.R.B. 15.
214. See 45 Fed. Reg. 18,953, 18,973 (1980).
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chapter S qualification requirements directly by amending
a second class of stock with delineated
the statute to allow
25
characteristics.
Until such time, however, it may be argued that the "for all purposes" language of section 385(a) automatically governs the Subchapter S question, given the one class of stock rule of section
21 6
1371(a)(4).
In light of the potential for the reclassification of instruments
originally classified as debt, the lack of a "second look" for instruments originally classified as equity seems to be a serious flaw. The
stated justifications for not permitting reclassification from equity to
debt are simplicity and to "avoid the need to recognize gain or
loss." 217 However, to the extent that reclassification of debt as
equity is allowed under section 1.385-6,218 reclassification should
operate as a two way street rather than work only against the
taxpayer.
VII. MODIFICATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RuLE

Since the general rule states that all instruments are to be
treated as indebtedness for all purposes of the Code, the truly significant aspects of the regulations are to be found in the provisions
which describe the numerous modifications and exceptions to the
general rule. These provisions operate to classify particular instruments as stock and can be classified into two general categories: 1)
provisions applicable to interests held by all creditors, 219 and 2) pro220
visions applicable to interests held by shareholder-creditors.
A. Provisions Applicable to Interests Held by All Creditors
There are two provisions which are applicable to interests held
by all creditors, each of which expresses concern as to the type or
form of the instrument. Section 1.385-5(a) deals with hybrid in222
struments, 22' and section 1.385-8(a) deals with locked interests.
215. Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Report on Staff Recommendations for Simplification of Tax Rules Relating to Subchapter S Corporations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 app. (1980).

216. I.,.C. §§ 385(a), 1371(a)(4) (1980).
217. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg.

18,957, 18,960 (1980).
218. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6 (1980).
219. See notes 221-63 and accompanying text infra.
220. See notes 269-472 and accompanying text infra.
221. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(a) (1980). See notes 223-56 and accompanying
text infra.
222. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-8(a) (1980). See notes 257-63 and accompanying
text infra.
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1. Hybrid Instruments
Hybrid instruments are instruments which contain both debt
and equity elements. Such instruments may have become popular
because they offer a corporation the opportunity to achieve the best
of both worlds by issuing an instrument that will be classified as
debt under tax law, but which provides extra equity benefits to the
corporation and its shareholders. 223 For instance, a corporation
wishing to protect itself from insolvency may issue a debt instrument to shareholders or other cooperative creditors which pays
interest at a rate dependent upon the earnings of the corporation.
By using an instrument which provides for contingent payments of
interest, the corporation receives a deduction for the interest paid
in the years when it has sufficient earnings to pay interest and it
can avoid insolvency by not paying interest in years when it has
insufficient earnings. 224 The discretionary power to pay interest
closely resembles a corporation's discretionary power to pay dividends to holders of an equity interest. In addition, a corporation
may attempt to attract investors by issuing debt instruments which
are convertible into the common stock of the corporation in order
to allow creditors to share in the future growth of the company.
Clearly, these types of debt instruments may be difficult to distin225
guish from stock.
Section 1.385-5(a) operates to classify hybrid instruments as debt
or equity.220 It is based upon the premise that a hybrid instrument
more closely resembles stock if the value of its equity elements is
greater than its value solely as a debt instrument, particularly if
the instrument's value as a debt instrument is reduced by subordination of the instrument to other creditors or by a low interest
rate. 227 Accordingly, a mechanical test is applied in order to determine the predominant characteristics of the instrument.2 28 The
presumption is that the total fair market value of a hybrid instrument embodies two separately identifiable components: 1) the value
of the right to fixed payments of interest and principal; and 2) the
223. See Plumb, supra note 2, at 405.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(a) (1980).
227. Supplementary Information
18,957, 18,960 (1980).
228.

to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg.

See notes 229-37 and accompanying text infra.
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value of its equity features, defined as the right to convert the instrument into stock and the right to receive contingent payments. 220
If at least half of the fair market value of the instrument is attributable to rights characteristic of indebtedness, the instrument
may be classified as indebtedness. 230 On the other hand, if the fair
market value of the instrument without its equity features is less
than one-half of the actual fair market value of the instrument,
the instrument is to be classified as stock.2 31 Two separate calculations must be made: 1) the actual fair market value of the entire
instrument, and 2) the fair market value of the instrument without
its equity features.2 32 If the instrument is registered with- the
Securities and Exchange Commission and sold to the public, the
fair market value of the total instrument on the day of its issue is
the issue price. 233 Otherwise, the fair market value is "the price at
which the instrument would change hands between a willing buyer
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or
sell and both having reasonable knowledge of all relevant facts." 234
The fair market value of an instrument without its equity features
apparently is to be calculated using standard bond tables and present
value methods since the rights being valued consist solely of rights
to fixed payments of interest and principal. 235 The proper discount
rate is to be determined by comparing the instrument to other
instruments which are freely traded in the bond market and which
have similar terms, a similar maturity date, and a similar risk classification or financial credit rating.236

The fair market value of the

229. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(b) (1980).

230. Id. § 1.385-4(a).
231. Id. § 1.385-5(a).
232. See notes 230-31 and accompanying text supra.
233. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(2)(ii) (1980).
234. Id. § 1.385-3(b)(1). See notes 99-104 and accompanying text supra.
235. The regulations under § 1232 explain how to determine the fair
market value of the debt portion of an obligation containing mixed debt
and equity characteristics which is sold as an investment unit:
The assumed price of the obligation shall be ascertained by comparison to the yields at which obligations of a similar character which
are not issued as part of an investment unit are sold in arm's
length transactions, and by adjusting the price of the obligation in
question to this yield. The adjustment may be made by subtracting
from the face amount of the obligation the total present value of
the interest foregone by the purchaser as a result of purchasing the
obligation at a lower yield as part of an investment unit.
Id. § 1.1232-3(b)(2)(ii)(a), T.D. 7663, 1980-1 C.B. 101.
236. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg.
18,957, 18,960 (1980).
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instrument without its equity features may be reduced if the instrument is subordinated to general creditors of the corporation or has
a distant maturity date, or by other factors affecting the value of
2 37
the rights characteristic of indebtedness.
When the fair market value of the instrument without its equity
features and the actual fair market value of the entire instrument
have been determined, the mechanical test determines whether the
debt features or the equity features are predominant. However, if
clear and convincing evidence shows that both the issuer and the
holder of the instrument, on the day of issue, reasonably believe that
the fair market value of the instrument without its equity features
would be greater than fifty percent of the actual fair market value
of the entire instrument, the mechanical test is modified as follows:
"A hybrid instrument is treated as stock if, on the day of issue, the
fair market value of the instrument without its equity features is
less than forty-five percent of the actual fair market value of the
instrument." 238 Thus, a five percent margin of error is permitted.
A hybrid instrument which escapes classification as stock under
section 1.385-5(a) is treated as a straight debt instrument. 239 Obviously, it is subject to any of the other exceptions to the general
240
rule which are applicable to straight debt instruments.
In evaluating this provision, a few comments seem appropriate.
First, it may be argued that the special rule which, based upon the
issuer's and the holder's reasonable beliefs, increases the portion of
the instrument which is allowed to represent an equity interest from
fifty percent to fifty-five percent, places an undeserved premium on
knowledge of the rule. Certainly, anyone aware of the rule will
both develop and document such a "reasonable belief," thereby
earning the more favorable standard. Those not aware of the rule
will be held to the stricter standard. This represents an unnecessary trap for the unwary or unadvised taxpayer. Moreover, the
"reasonable belief" standard is not very clear. Questions arise as
to the type and quantum of evidence needed to support such a
belief.
Second, it may be argued that a non-shareholder creditor who
deals on an arm's length basis with a corporation should never be
treated as a shareholder. An exception for independent creditors
237. Id.
238. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(c) (1980).
239. Id. § 1.385-5(a). A straight debt instrument is defined as "any
instrument other than a hybrid instrument." Id. § 1.3 8 5-3(g).
240. Id. § 1.385-2(b)(2).
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has been included for other provisions, 241 and perhaps a similar
exception is needed for section 1.385-5(a).242 Alternatively, the
regulations could specify that the only situation in which non-shareholders will be treated as owning equity instruments would be when
such instruments are subordinated to the rights of general creditors
and thus are on the borderline between debt and preferred stock.
Otherwise, section 1.385-5(a) may operate to completely eliminate
243
the use of hybrid instruments.
Third, the Secretary surely recognizes that the primary purpose
of a hybrid instrument is to obtain a lower interest rate than would
be possible with a straight debt instrument. Yet, the fact that reduced interest is being paid on the hybrid instrument operates to
lower the value of the instrument without its equity features, which
increases the possibility that the instrument will be classified as
stock. The Secretary seems to be saying that it is acceptable for
corporations to use sophisticated financing instruments to lower their
effective interest expense as long as their interest costs are not lowered too much. In this connection, it must be noted that section
1.385-8(a) does allow favorable treatment of some debt instruments
with an "equity-kicker." 244 To obtain this favored status, all that
is necessary is for the corporation to issue debt instruments with
non-detachable warrants rather than convertible debt instruments.
In this way, potential adverse classification under section 1.385-5(a)
245
may be avoided entirely.
Fourth, while the concept of fair market value is generally
understood, it is not readily determinable when applied to specific
fact situations. Therefore, there is a great likelihood of numerous
disputes between the Service and taxpayers with regard to valuation.
The examples are not helpful in this regard as they are all based
upon an assumption of an established fair market value.246 All that
is indicated by these examples is that various factors such as time to
maturity, subordination, and non-interest bearing status affect the
valuation of an instrument without its equity features. They do
not illustrate how to compute the specified fair market values in
light of the fact situations described. Conflicts concerning valuation
could be reduced if the regulations were modified to illustrate spe241. None of the classification rules which apply if there is substantial
proportionality are applicable if the instrument is held by an independent
creditor. Id. § 1.385-6(a)(3)(ii).
242. Id. § 1.385-5(a).
243. Id.
244. Id. § 1.385-8(a).
245. See notes 258-62 and accompanying text infra.
246. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(e), -5(f) (1980).
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cifically how the fair market values that are specified in the examples were determined, with appropriate explanation of the
mechanics.
Finally, the objective test used in section 1.385-5(a) is not consistent with the approach used by the courts in determining whether
a hybrid instrument is debt or equity. 247 Although the facts of the
examples in this section are said to be variations on facts taken from
various court decisions, 248 the test adopted by this regulation is not
the same as the one used by the courts. At one time, courts would
determine if hybrid instruments were debt or equity by closely
examining the formal characteristics of the instrument in question 249 in an attempt to determine the intent of the parties.250 Thus,
shareholders of closely-held corporations could obtain the tax advantages of debt by formally providing for unconditional obligations
payable with fixed interest at fixed dates, while the corporation and
the shareholder tacitly understood that the shareholder would not
enforce these rights. 25x However, in response to this abuse, the
courts began to look beyond the four corners of the instrument and
252
started using a set of factors to distinguish debt from equity.
Some of the factors which the regulations use to define hybrid instruments have been used by the courts to determine if such instruments are debt or equity, 25 3 but the comparison of value test adopted
by the regulations finds no support in the case law. The courts
examine hybrid instruments as they would any other type of instrument, applying a set of factors 214 in order to determine whether
there was an intent to create a bona fide debt.2 5 While it is true
247. Id. § 1.385-5(a).
248. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg.
18,957, 18,960 (1980).
249. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Meredian 8c 13th Realty Co., 132 F.2d
182 (7th Cir. 1942); Commissioner v. Proctor Shop, 82 F.2d 792, 794 (9th
Cir. 1936); 250 Hudson St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 5 T.C.M. (CCH) 722,
727-28 (1946); Glenmore Distilleries Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A.
213, 227-28 (1942).
250. See Caplin, supra note 116, at 775; Gerver, supra note 44, at 29;
Morris, Intent Test Grows as Determinant of Thin Incorporation Safety, 13
J. TAX. 130, 131 (1960).
251. Plumb, supra note 2, at 406-07.
252. Id. at 407. For a list of the factors typically used by the courts, see

note 7 supra.
253. Among the factors considered by the courts are whether the payments of interest and principal are contingent and whether the interest rate
is definitely ascertainable. Plumb, supra note 2, at 430-42.
254. See note 8 supra.
255. Aarons, supra note 175, at 194. See, e.g., Dixie Dairies Corp. v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 476 (1980); Litton Business Sys., Inc. v. Commissioner,
61 T.C. 367, 377 (1973), acq. 1974-2 C.B. 3.
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that the regulations are trying to replace a set of subjective factors
with an objective test, 256 the mechanical test chosen has no basis in
the existing case law.

2. Locked Interests
25 7
Section 1.385-8 deals with the classification of locked interests..
This type of interest consists of a note or other evidence of indebtedness that is inseparable from an option to acquire stock. In
general, the regulations classify this type of interest as two separate
and distinct interests even though title to one cannot be transferred
without transferring title to the other.25 8 This result is contrary to
the view previously expressed by the Tax Court that the fact that
notes are locked into stock is an indication that the notes are really
stock. 25 9 The reason specified for this divergence is that most hybrid instruments issued by closely-held corporations will be treated
as stock under section 1.385-6(c)(1).4 0 Yet, such a corporation may
have a valid business reason for issuing interests containing both
Section
equity and indebtedness features to its shareholders.
1.385-8(a) makes this possible because the corporation may simply
create two separate interests locked together rather than one hybrid
interest.-"' The creation of two separate interests makes possible a
natural classification of one interest as stock and the other as
22
indebtedness.
The apparent thrust of this provision is that a taxpayer can
avoid adverse classification under sections 1.385-5(a) and 1.385-6
(c)(1) simply by restructuring instruments from convertible debt
0"
instruments to debt instruments with non-detachable warrants.
Although such a provision is undoubtedly favorable to taxpayers,
such exaltation of form over substance appears to be but another
trap for the unwary or unadvised taxpayer.

256. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg.
18,957, 18,960 (1980).

257. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-8 (1980).
258. Id. § 1.385-8(a).
259. See Universal Castings Corp. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 107 (1961),
af'd, 303 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1962). The Secretary recognizes that the regulations diverge from the Tax Court's position. Supplementary Information to

Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,957, 18,962 (1980).
260. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(c)(1) (1980).

261. Id. § 1.385-8(a).
262. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg.
18,957, 18,962 (1980).
263. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-5(a), -6(c)(1) (1980).
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B. Provisions Applicable to Interests Held by
Shareholder-Creditors
The overwhelming majority of the classification provisions
contained in the regulations are devoted to interests held by shareholder-creditors. These provisions deal with several diverse types
of transactions, including loans by third parties which are guaranteed by shareholders, 264 instruments with a fair market value different from the consideration paid by the shareholder for the
instrument, 2 5 unwritten loans and cash advances made by a shareholder, 26 6 and instruments issued to shareholders whose holdings of
stock and the instruments are substantially proportionate.2 7
1. GuaranteedLoans
If a shareholder either directly or indirectly guarantees a loan
made to his corporation by an independent third party lender and,
under relevant legal principles applied without reference to the
regulations under section 385, the loan would be treated as made
to the shareholder, 268 the shareholder is treated as making a contribution to the capital of the corporation. 269 It may be argued
that this regulation is an interpretative rather than a legislative
regulation 270 and is therefore more open to attack on the theory
that the Secretary has exceeded his authority. In section 385,
Congress delegated to the Secretary the authority to promulgate
regulations which would "determine whether an interest in a corporation is to be treated

. . .

as stock or indebtedness."

271

There-

fore, the regulations should focus upon an interest in the corporation, and, in the guaranteed loan situation, the inquiry should be
directed to the actual loan from the third party, not upon the
hypothetical contribution to capital by the shareholder-guarantor.
By restructuring the transaction and treating the loan as being made
to a shareholder, who in turn makes a contribution of capital,
section 1.385-9 creates a new interest in the corporation. 272 It is
submitted that such a restructuring goes beyond the authority dele-

gated by section 385.

It follows that the regulation is an inter-

264. See notes 268-91 and accompanying text infra.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

See notes 292-325 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 326-42 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 343-472 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 279-80 and accompanying text infra.
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-9(a) (1980).
See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
I.R.C. § 385(a).
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-9 (1980).
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pretative regulation issued under the authority of section 7805..273
As such, the strong presumption of validity judicially granted to
legislative regulations would not apply to section 1.385-9, leaving
274
it more vulnerable to taxpayer attack.
In addition, it is suggested that the provision will create more
problems than it will resolve. It is recognized that the provision
is nothing more than an application of the basic tax doctrine of
substance over form to the guaranteed loan area. 275 As such, the
provision adds nothing to this area of the tax law. In view of the
notation by the drafters that "nothing in the regulations under
section 385 is intended to preclude the application of general tax
law principles such as substance over form, step transaction, and
so on," 276 the provision clearly is not needed. Furthermore, section
1.385-9(a), as finally issued, 7 7 is considered by the drafters to be
merely a "restatement of existing case law." 278 Under Plantation
Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner,27 0 specifically used as authority for

this regulation by the Treasury, loans to corporations by outsiders
which are guaranteed by shareholders may be treated as loans to
the shareholder, who then is considered to have advanced the proceeds to the corporation as a contribution to capital.28 0 Section
1.385-9(a) is therefore harmless to the extent that it does not create
273. I.R.C. § 7805 (1976).
274. This does not mean that it will be a simple task to have this
particular regulation invalidated. The Treasury may not promulgate an arbitrary or unreasonable regulation, nor can it change the scope of the statute
or rectify a supposed omission. See 1 J. MERTENS, supra note 19, § 3.21.
However, the courts give considerable weight to the Treasury's construction
of a statute and, unless contrary to the statute, interpretative regulations will
be upheld if they are reasonable interpretations. Id.
275. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
276. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg.
18,957, 18,960 (1980).
277. The comparable provision of the proposed regulations provided that
if it was not reasonable to expect that the loan would be enforced according
to its terms, the loan would be treated as a contribution to capital. See Prop.
Reg. § 1.385-11.
This standard was taken from a case which involved a
father's guarantee of a loan to his son. See Ellisberg v. Commissioner, 9 TC.
463 (1947). The drafters of the final regulations responded to critical comments concerning this confusing test and its application to the area of shareholder guarantees by changing the regulation to its current form. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.385-9(a) (1980).
278. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-9(a) (1980).
279. 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 817 (1970), aff'd, 462 F.2d 712 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972). See also Barclay Co. v. Commissioner, 23
T.C.M. (CCH) 1695 (1964); J. A. Maurer, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.
1273 (1958); Markle v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1593 (1952).
280. See 29 T.C.M. (CCH) at 825. But see Murphy Logging Co. v.
United States, 378 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1967) (refused to collapse transaction).
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any new problems for the shareholder of a closely-held corporation.

Yet, because it does not add any certainty to this area, relying instead on the maze of factors applied by the courts, 28 ' the utility of
this part of the regulations should be questioned.
Finally, this "restatement" of the case law may tend to influence
courts addressing the issue of whether a loan should be treated as
made to a guarantor-shareholder rather than to a corporation.
Clearly, the courts recognize that banks and other commercial
lenders frequently require the guarantees of shareholders when a
loan is being made to a small corporation.28 2 It is also recognized
that the fact that the loan would not have been made without a
shareholder's guaranty does not alone warrant a finding that the
loan is really a contribution of capital.283 However, courts may
ostensibly rely on section 1.385-9(a) to buttress their conclusion that
the loan was made to the shareholder when in reality their decision
is based on little more than "an internal reaction to the propriety
of the transaction." 284 Existing case law makes it clear that the
issue of whether a guaranteed loan should be treated as a contribution of capital is to be decided by utilizing the traditional factors
28
used by the courts in distinguishing debt from equity.

5

Com-

mentators have noted that the use of this often conflicting set of
factors allows a court to justify any conclusion.286 Therefore, the
courts may also use section 1.385-9(a) to add "official" weight to a
28 7
decision that a guaranteed loan was a contribution of capital.
Because of this potential misuse and the lack of utility of a provision which does no more than restate the case law, it can be
strongly asserted that section 1.385-9 should be eliminated from
28
these regulations.
More importantly to small corporations, section 1.385-9 does
not reflect the realities of financing available to such entities. Due
to the size of loans to small corporations, many lenders cannot afford
to have a negotiated lending agreement on every loan since these
agreements can be very elaborate and usually contain restrictions of
various types, including limitations on salaries, dividends, and asset
281. See note 7 supra. See also Plumb, supra note 2, at 411-555.
282. See Plumb, supra note 2, at 369.

283. Smyers v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 189, 199 (1971); Santa Anita Con-

sol., Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 536, 552 (1968).

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Caplin, supra note 116, at 811.
See note 279 supra and authorities cited therein.
See Caplin, supra note 116, at 811; Plumb, supra note 2, at 408.
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-9(a) (1980).
Id. § 1,385-9.
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purchases, designation of management personnel, and working capital requirements. To avoid the time and difficulties of negotiating
the many provisions that might otherwise appear in a loan agreement, a lender will usually either provide the loan on a short term,
renewable basis, giving the lending institution the option to call the
loan if it feels insecure, or provide the loan with no supporting
lending agreement and have one or more of the shareholders guarantee the loan. 2 9 Furthermore, since it is convenient to request
and obtain shareholder guarantees, a lender will frequently receive
such guarantees even though they are not considered absolutely
necessary by the lender and are a negotiable aspect of the transaction.2 90

Therefore, many, if not most, new and small corporations

are requested by independent lenders to have corporate notes guaranteed by shareholders. Section 1.385-9(a) can serve to make this
common formality become a taxable event to the guarantors upon
the subsequent repayment of the note by the borrowing cor29
poration. '
2. Instruments With a FairMarket Value Difterent from the
Consideration Paid by the Shareholder-Creditor

In general, the provisions of the regulations under section 385
classify an interest in a corporation as either indebtedness or stock.
However, section 1.385-3(a) requires an interest to be treated in
part as stock and in part as indebtedness.2 92 When a corporation
issues instruments to its shareholders, a determination as to the debt
or equity status of the instruments is made, after which section
1.385-3(a) requires a comparison of the fair market value of the
29 3
If
instruments with the consideration paid for the instruments.
the consideration paid for an instrument exceeds its fair market
value, the excess is treated as a contribution to capital whether the
instrument is classified as stock or indebtedness.29 4 If the fair market value of the instrument exceeds the consideration paid, and if
289. See Plumb, supra note 2, at 487. See also Santa Anita Consol., Inc.
v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 536, 552 (1968).

44

290. Hickman, The Thin Corporation:Another Look at An Old Disease,

883, 890 (1966).
291. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-9(a) (1980).

TAXES

The ultimate consequence is the

denial of an interest deduction to the corporation and the taxation of the

shhreholder on the receipt of the principal payment.
183, at 835.
292. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) (1980).

See Bittker, supra note

Section 1.385-8(a), dealing with locked

interests, also requires an interest to be treated as part stock and part debt. See
notes 258-62 and accompanying text supra.
293. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) (1980).
294. Id. § 1.385-3(a)(1).
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the instrument is classified as indebtedness, the excess is treated as a
distribution to which section 301 applies. 29 5 Finally, if the fair
market value of the instrument exceeds the consideration paid, and
if the instrument is classified as preferred stock, this excess is treated
as a distribution to which section 305 applies. 296 The effect of these
specified treatments is to require the consideration deemed to have
been paid for the instrument to equal the fair market value of the
instrument, regardless of the price set by the corporation and its
shareholders. It follows that the issue price of an instrument will
then equal its fair market value since issue price refers to the amount
29 7
that is considered to have been paid for the instrument.
By establishing the issue price, section 1.385-3(a) also has the
effect of insuring that principal and interest will be paid on the
instruments in the same proportions as would be paid to outside
creditors. 298 In order to understand this point, it is necessary to
consider some additional rules. Original issue discount is defined
in section 1232(b)(1) as the difference between the issue price and
the stated redemption price at maturity.2 9 Amortizable bond premium is defined in section 1.61-12(c)(4) as the excess of the issue
price over the amount payable at maturity. 00 If a bond is sold with
original issue discount, the amount of the discount must be included
ratably over the life of the bond in the income of the holder of the
bond

01

A corresponding deduction is allowed to the corpora-

tion. 2 Likewise, if a bond is sold at a premium, the amount of
the premium is included ratably over the life of the bond in the
income of the corporate issuer.30 3 A corresponding deduction is
allowed to the holder of the instrument. 30 4 Therefore, the creation
by the regulations of original issue discount and amortizable bond
premium has the effect of adjusting the amount of interest income
of the creditor and the interest deduction which would have resulted if the issue price and interest rate had conformed to arm's
length standards. This adjustment insures that the allocation of
loan repayments between principal and income is reasonable.
30

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. § 1.385-3(a)(2)(i). See I.R.C. § 301 (1978).
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a)(2)(ii) (1980). See I.R.C. § 305 (1976).
See I.R.C. § 1232(b)(2) (1976).
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) (1980).
I.R.C. § 1232(b)(1) (1976).
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(4), T.D. 6984, 1969-1 C.B. 38.
I.R.C. § 1232(a)(3)(A) (1976).
Treas. Reg. § 1.163-4(a), T.D. 7259, 1973-1 C.B. 143.
Id. § 1.61-12(c)(2), T.D. 6984, 1969-1 C.B. 38.
I.R.C. § 171(a)(1) (1976).
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It should be noted that neither original issue discount nor amortizable bond premium is created when an instrument is payable on
demand or is issued in exchange for property. If an instrument is
payable on demand, the issue price of the instrument will always
equal its stated redemption price; therefore, there is by definition,
no original issue discount or bond premium. 0 5 Likewise, if an
instrument which is not traded on an established securities market
is issued for property, the issue price is deemed to be equal to the
stated redemption price at maturity, with the result that there is no
discount or premium.30 6 Since the mechanics of original issue discount and amortizable bond premium are not available to regulate
the interest rates of demand instruments and instruments issued for
property, the Secretary has provided special rules for when arm's
length bargaining does not exist.307 This is the justification for section 1.385-6(d), which deals with an instrument issued for property
to a shareholder whose holdings of stock and instruments are substantially proportionate,30s and for section 1.385-6(l)(1), which deals
with a demand instrument issued to a shareholder whose holdings
of stock and instruments are substantially proportionate. 3°°
The treatment specified in section 1.385-3(a) appears to be derived from a critical evaluation of the analytical approach applied
3 10
by the courts in cases similar to Tomlinson v. 1661 Corporation.
In resolving conflicts in this area, the courts generally start with an
enumeration of factors, some of which tend to show that an instrument is stock while others tend to support a finding that it is indebtedness. 31' In the end, the courts must decide whether the instruments involved are stock or debt. However, the method by which
the courts weigh the competing evidence is not entirely clear. Consequently, the conclusions reached provide little guidance for the
305. A corporation would not issue a demand instrument at a discount
because its creditor could immediately demand the face amount of the instrument. A creditor would not buy a demand instrument at a premium because the corporation could immediately retire the debt at the face amount.
306. I.R.C. § 1232(b)(2) (1976).

307. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg.
18,957, 18,961 (1980).

308. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(d) (1980). See notes 414-30 and accompanying
text infra.
309, Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(1) (1980). See notes 432-39 and accompany.
ing text infra.
310. 377 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1967). See Supplementary Information to
Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,957, 18,958 (1980).

311. See note 8 supra.
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future, even for similar fact situations.3 12 Section 1.385-3(a) attempts to substitute a fair market value test for the predominant
characteristics test generally applied by the courts. 31 3 Thus, the
analysis under section 1.385-3(a) differs from that contained in the
case law in that the inquiry does not focus upon whether the nature
of the instrument is stock or indebtedness. Instead, the focus is
upon whether the payment to the corporation is payment for in3 14
debtedness or part payment for stock and part payment for debt.
By posturing the inquiry in this manner, section 1.385-3(a) supposedly attains three goals. First, the subjective analysis of the case
law is replaced with the definitive inquiry into the fair market value
of the debenture. Second, it remains responsive to the relevant
factors identified in the case law since these factors have a direct
bearing upon the fair market value. Finally, the provision makes
it easier for the government and the taxpayer to reach a com315
promise.
Under the existing case law, an instrument must be classified
as either stock or indebtedness, leaving little room for compromise.3 16 However, section 1.385-3(a) does not replace the classification process.3 17 That is, the full face amount of an instrument is
always classified as either stock or indebtedness before its issue price
is determined under this provision. Therefore, it is very difficult
to identify the claimed avenue of compromise. It may be argued
that section 1.385-3(a) provides the Commissioner with an incentive
to agree with the taxpayer that an instrument is indebtedness in
those situations in which it is questionable whether one of the exceptions to the general rule operates to classify an instrument en312. See Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159, 165
(6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957). See also Comment, supra
note 16, at 1705-07.
313. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) (1980).
314. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg.
18,957, 18,959 (1980).
315. Id.
316. This all or nothing approach has been criticized by several commentators. See, e.g., Aarons, supra note 175, at 197; Plumb, supra note 2, at
611. Aarons suggests using an approach by which part of an interest can be
classified as stock and the other part as debt. Aarons, supra note 175, at
197. The impropriety of this all or nothing approach is illustrated in
American Processing & Sales Co. v. United States, 317 F.2d 842 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
In American Processing, rather than imposing the all capital structure upon
the corporation which would result from application of the government's all
or nothing argument, the court found for the taxpayer and criticized the
government's position as "a more absurd result than reason permits be entertained." Id. at 856.
317. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) (1980).
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tirely as stock. Having conceded indebtedness to the taxpayer in
these questionable situations, the Commissioner could then apply
this rule to convert part of the payment to equity. If this is what the
drafters intended, then the section does offer an avenue of negotiation. However, it seems risky to read into the regulations such an
intent on the part of the Secretary. A more plausible interpretation of section 1.385-3(a) is that it was written to provide the Commissioner with a final means of attack in the debt-equity classification area. In other words, assuming that a taxpayer is successful
in obtaining his desired classification through the general rule of
section 1.385-4(a) and the numerous exceptions that are contained
in the regulations, the Commissioner can still assert section 1.3853(a) to salvage a small victory in that at least part of the taxpayer's
instrument will be reclassified into the unfavorable classification. 31 a
Section 385 authorizes the Secretary to promulgate regulations
for the purpose of determining "whether an interest in a corporation is to be treated . . . as stock or indebtedness." 319

In this re-

gard, the Senate Finance Committee stated that "the provision specifies that these guidelines are to set forth factors to be taken into
account in determining . . . whether a debtor-creditor relationship

exists or whether a corporation-shareholder relationship exists." ,20
It therefore appears that the congressional delegation of authority
under section 385, although broad, does not extend beyond providing rules for determining whether an interest is to be treated as
debt or equity. It follows that neither congressional mandate nor
intent authorizes that rules for the determination of issue price be
prescribed under section 385. If this position is correct, section
1.385-3 is not a legislative regulation, but is rather an interpretative
regulation.32 1 As such, it does not have the authority of a regulation
under section 385,322 and may be attacked, with a somewhat greater
chance of success, as being beyond the Secretary's authority. Even
the drafters of the provision acknowledge that section 1.385-3 does
not inquire into the nature of the instrument.8 23 Thus, it can be
asserted that this provision is statutory in nature and that it goes
beyond the authority delegated to the Secretary because its purpose
318. Id. §§ 1.385-4(a), -3(a).

319. I.R.C. § 385(a).
320. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 138 (1969). See also I.R.C.
§385(b).
321. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3 (1980). See Beghe, supra note 24, at 933. See
also notes 21 & 274 supra.
322. As an interpretative regulation, it is issued under the authority of
§ 7805(a) of the Code. See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1976).
323. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg.

18,957, 18,959 (1980).
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is to determine the issue price of an instrument regardless of whether
it is debt or equity.Section 1.385-3(a) is applicable to all loans made to corporations by shareholders, regardless of the percentage of ownership of
any particular shareholder.3 24 Yet, it is suggested that the section
serves no useful purpose in distinguishing between debt and equity
interests when the shareholder and the corporation are dealing with
each other on an arm's length basis. Moreover, applying such rules
in arm's length situations appears to add needless complications to
an already complex set of rules. Therefore, this section should be
made applicable to shareholder loans only when there exists "substantial proportionality" between holdings of the instrument in
question and the outstanding stock of the corporation under the
rules provided in section 1.385-6(a). 32.

In all other circumstances,

the price of the instruments issued and the creation of original issue
discount or amortizable bond premium should be decided without
reference to section 385 or the regulations thereunder.
3. Unwritten Loans and Cash Advances by One who is
not an Independent Creditor
If a loan is made to a corporation by any party other than an
independent creditor, and if within six months after the loan is
made there is no written document, enforceable under applicable
non-tax law, containing all the material terms and conditions of
the loan, section 1.385-7(b) will operate to classify the loan as debt
or equity. Generally, such informal obligations are treated as indebtedness.3

2

However, such loans will be treated as contributions

to capital if, when the loan is made, the debtor corporation has
excessive debt 327 as defined in section 1.385-6(f).322 The requirement that the corporation must be inadequately capitalized indicates that the danger of informal shareholder advances is not that
they are tax avoidance vehicles per se, but rather that in certain
circumstances they are likely to merge into the shareholders' equity
and represent money which has been placed at the risk of the
business.
In addition, even when an unwritten obligation has been classified as indebtedness, if the debtor corporation fails to pay interest
324. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) (1980).

325. Id. § 1.385-6(a).

See notes 357-74 and accompanying text infra.

326. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(b)(1) (1980).

327. See id. § 1.385-7(b)(2).
328. Id. § 1.385-6(f). For a discussion of this rule, see notes 392-413 and
accompanying text infra.
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oil the loan at a reasonable rate 329 during any taxable year of the
debtor corporation, the loan is reclassified as a contribution to capital as of the later of the first day of such taxable year or the date of
3 0 For
the loan.8
purposes of this provision, a rate is considered to
be reasonable if it is reasonable as of any day of the taxable year.33 '
If a loan is originally classified as a contribution to capital, or is
reclassified as such, all payments of principal and interest made on
the loan after the date of reclassification are treated as distributions
to which section 301 of the Code applies.3 3 2 Once a loan is reclassified, its status as a contribution to capital can never change. 83
As originally drafted, section 1.385-7(b) applied to all unwritten loans made by all shareholders.. 3 4 However, in the final regulations this rule applies to "certain other obligations" 3s5 made by
one who is not an independent creditor.3 3 6 This change produces
some results which deserve comment. First, the term "certain other
obligations" is considered to be broader than unwritten loans in
that it applies to loans where the material terms and conditions are
contained in a document other than the instrument, such as a board
of directors resolution or an entry in the corporation's books, as
well as to all unwritten loans. 3 7 Second, by applying the rule only
if the lender is not an independent creditor, the Secretary accomplished two purposes; he assured that section 1.385-7(b) generally
will not apply to shareholders owning minimal amounts of stock,338
and he made it clear that section 1.385-7 would apply to unwritten
loans between brother-sister corporations wholly-owned by a comnmon parent.
329. What constitutes a reasonable rate is defined in § 1.385-6(e). For a
discussion of this regulation, see notes 153-204 and accompanying text supra.
330. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(c)(1) (1980).
331. Id.
332. Id. § 1.385.7(d)(2). Thus, instead of receiving a tax-free return of
capital in the form of a repayment of principal, a shareholder will have ordinary income to the extent of the corporation's earnings and profits. See
note 37 and accompanying text supra.
333. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(d)(2) (1980).
334. See Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed.
Reg. 18,957, 18,971 (1980).
335. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-7(a) (1980).
336. Id.
337. See T.D. 7747, 1981-8 I.R.B. 15.
338. Unless a lender actually or constructively owns more than five percent
of a corporation's stock, or unless his holdings of stock and instruments issued by the corporation are substantially proportionate, the lender will be
an independent creditor under the safe harbor found in section 1.385-6(b)(2).
See notes 80-84 and accompanying text supra.
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As has been noted previously, the central issue in debt versus
equity cases is the intent of the parties as determined in the light
of economic reality.3

39

Objective evidence of intent is generally

not to be accorded special weight 40 The documentation of the
advance is considered to be an example of objective evidence and
therefore the lack of a written agreement is not considered to carry
great weight by the courts.8 41 The courts have been more interested
in subjective evidence of the intent of the parties, and many factors
are examined to determine this intent. 342

The reliance of section

1.385-7 on only one such factor, the lack of adequate capitalization,
is therefore inconsistent with the case law. It is suggested that the
Secretary reconsider the regulations' approach to unwritten obligations and amend them to be more consistent with existing case law.
It is true that some certainty will be sacrificed, but in this case, the
price of certainty is too high.
4. Instruments Held by Shareholders whose Holdings of Stock and
Instruments are Substantially Proportionate

The drafters of the regulations state that proportionality plays
a central role in the regulations because it generally makes little
economic difference whether proportionate shareholder advances
are made as debt or equity.

43

In other words, shareholders holding

stock and instruments in the same proportion are entitled to the
corporation's entire net profits and generally will be indifferent, if
tax consequences are disregarded, to whether the profits are withdrawn from the corporation as interest and principal payments on
debt or as dividends and payments in redemption of stock.3 44 Similarly, in the case of debt, such shareholders are generally indifferent
to the allocation between principal and interest except for the tax
consequences. On the other hand, a decision to receive debt instead
of stock is very significant from a tax viewpoint. 4 5 Moreover, once
the shareholders have elected to receive debt, the allocation of the
repayments between principal and interest can have important tax
consequences.

3

46

339. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
340. See A. R. Lantz Co., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th
Cir. 1970).
341. See id.
342. See Plumb, supra note 2, at 462.
343. See T.D. 7747, 1981-8 I.R.B. 15.
344. See Stone, Debt-Equity Distinctions in the Tax Treatment of the
Corporation and its Shareholders, 42 TUL. L. REV. 251, 258 (1968).
345. See notes 35-52 and accompanying text supra.
346. Id.
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Because shareholders holding instruments in the same proportion as their holdings of stock have no economic incentive to negotiate at arm's length when additional financing is required by the
corporation, regulations were considered necessary in order to insure
that financing arrangements reflect economic reality.3 47 Where possible, the regulations recast particular transactions to reflect economic reality. However, if a proper recasting cannot take place,
the regulations classify proportionally-held instruments as stock.
Although the drafters magnanimously state that the regulations
could have provided that all proportionally-held shareholder debt
could be treated as stock under the regulations,3 48 proportionality
has clearly not been given such overpowering weight by the main
body of case law. Proportionality raises a "strong inference" that
the interest is not debt,3 49 but no one factor controls,3 10 and "ordinarily there must be 'something more' " 351 than proportionality to
convince a court that an interest is stock. 352 Therefore, the reliance
on the existence of substantial proportionality alone to classify instruments as stock would be inconsistent with the case law. It is
uncertain whether a regulation requiring such treatment would be
upheld by the courts. At the very least, such a regulation would be
eroded by construction. Consequently, the Secretary's rationale for
elevating the existence of substantial proportionality to such a position of importance in the regulations is unsound.
There are eight provisions under section 1.385-6 and they can
be classified into four categories: 1) a provision relating to proportionally-held hybrid instruments; 353 2) a provision to insure adequate capitalization; .114 3) provisions to insure an arm's length
interest rate; .'55 and 4) provisions to insure arm's length enforcement of an instrument's terms.3 56 Before discussing the specific
classification rules within each of these four categories, it is necessary
347. See T.D. 7747, 1981-8 I.R.B. 15.
348. Id.
349. See Charter Wire, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 878, 880 (7th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1965).
350. See note 8 supra.
351. Plumb, supra note 2, at 471.
852. Id. The American Law Institute's proposal for a safe harbor which,
if its requirements were met, would treat an interest as indebtedness, did not
treat proportionality as a relevant factor. See ALI FEDERAL INCOME TAX
STATUTE §X500(g) (Feb. 1954 Draft).
353. See notes 375-90 and accompanying text infra.
354. See notes 391-413 and accompanying text infra.
355. See notes 414-39 and accompanying text infra.
356. See notes 440-72 and accompanying text infra.
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to first consider how to determine whether a shareholder's holdings
of stock and instruments are substantially proportionate.
a. Determining Whether Holdings of Stock and Instruments
are Substantially Proportionate
Substantial proportionality is determined from "all relevant
facts and circumstances, including family or other relationships
described in section 318(a)." 37 Thus, the regulations do not provide a mechanical test for determining whether holdings of stock and
holdings of a class of instruments are substantially proportionate.
In fact, proportionality is not even defined. It is provided, however, that holdings are not substantially proportionate if a corporation's stock and instruments are widely held and the instruments are
separately traded and readily marketable.

88

This rule will prob-

ably exempt most publicly-held corporations from the associated
classification rules. Additionally, any instrument held by an independent creditor =9 is not regarded as being held in substantial
proportion to any stock holdings. 360 Aside from these two exceptions, the only guidance is set forth in the examples found in section
1.385-6(a). However, the examples do not provide much assistance
for determining from "all relevant facts and circumstances" 361
whether substantial proportionality exists. The holdings of stock
and indebtedness in the examples are either clearly proportionate
or just as obviously disproportionate. 362 None of the additional
examples added to the final regulations, included to help define
when substantial proportionality exists, 3 63 seem to fall within the

indistinct middle range in which many corporations will find themselves as their shareholders attempt to come as close to the line as
possible. The Secretary has announced that the Service will establish numerical guidelines, and will publish them in a revenue procedure30 4 However, because proportionality plays such a central
role in the final regulations, 365 both the term "substantial propor357. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(2) (1980). See I.R.C. § 318(a) (1964).
358. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(3)(i) (1980).
359. The term "independent creditor" is defined in § 1.385-6(b).
notes 80-84 and accompanying text supra.
360. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(3)(ii) (1980).

See

361. Id. § 1.385-6(a)(2).

362. See Beghe, An Interim Report on the Debt-Equity Regulations under Code Section 385, 59 TAXES 203, 211 n.63 (1981).
363. See T.D. 7747, 1981-8 I.R.B. 15.
364. Id.
365. Id.
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tionality" and how it will be applied demand clarification in the
regulations themselves.
It has been suggested that the Secretary should provide objective standards for determining substantial proportionality by applying the familiar statistical concept of standard deviation.3 6 Absolute proportionality would exist if the stock percentage and the
instrument percentage of each holder were identical. Any change
from absolute proportionality produces a deviation. The regulations could provide that unless the standard deviation of the group
of shareholders as a whole is sufficiently large, substantial proportionality exists.
The court decisions in this area are not of much help in defining substantial proportionality. Like the examples in the regulations, the relationship between the holdings of stock and purported
36 7
debt seem to be either identical or clearly not pro rata.
The regulations indicate that "family or other relationships
described in section 318(a)" 868 should be considered in determining
whether substantial proportionality exists.30 9 Because applicability
of the attribution rules of section 318 to any specific context depends
upon their incorporation by another Code provision,3 70 this reference in the regulations does not technically make section 318 applicable.37 1 However, the attribution rules have been considered by
the courts in determining whether proportionality exists, 37 2 and are
a relevant consideration under the regulations. Because of this
"unofficial" application of section 318, it is submitted that if special
circumstances can be shown, such as family hostility,3 73 the family
366. Letter from Robert J. McGee to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (April 1, 1980) cited in Beghe, supra note 362, at 211.
367. See, e.g., Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 409 (5th
Cir. 1972) (15% shareholder advanced 80% of loans, while two 2% shareholders contributed remaining 20% in equal shares); Miele v. Commissioner,
56 T.C. 556 (1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
826 (1973), acq. 1972-2 C.B. 2 (exact proportionality); Stinnett v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 221, 229 n.4 (1970) (each stockholder owned approximately

25% of stock but advances ranged from 10% to 60%).
368. See note 357 and accompanying text supra.

369. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(a)(2)(i) (1980).
370. See I.R.C. § 318(a) (1964).

371. See Slappey Drive Indus. Park v. United States, 561 F.2d 572, 584
n.21 (5th Cir. 1977).

372. See, e.g., id. at 584; Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394,
398 n.3, 409 (5th Cir. 1972).

373. The family hostility doctrine has been used to nullify the family
attribution rules in the § 302 redemption area. See Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975). See I.R.C. .302 (1980). This case was
distinguished in a recent Tax Court opinion which did not allow the use of

the family hostility doctrine in the redemption area.

See Metzger Trust v.
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attribution rules should not be applied merely because the regula74
tion specifically makes reference to them.
b. Proportionately-Held Hybrid Instruments
'There are two provisions in the regulations which deal with the
classification of hybrid instruments 376 as stock or indebtedness. Section 1.385-5 376 applies primarily to hybrid instruments issued by
public corporations and section 1.385-6(c) generally applies to hybrid
3
instruments issued by closely-held corporationsY.
Under this latter
section, hybrid instruments issued to shareholders whose holdings
of stock and instruments are substantially proportionate 37 will be
3 79
classified as stock.
. Three reasons are stated for this flat rule. 3 0 First, since hybrid
instruments which are issued to the shareholders of closely-held corporations are difficult to value, it is impractical to attempt to apply
the calculation specified in section 1.385-5(a), which requires a comparison of the fair market value of an instrument with its equity
features with its fair market value without such features. 88 ' Second,
a closely-held corporation can avoid section 1.385-6(c) entirely while
achieving the same result that is obtained with a hybrid instrument
by issuing bonds with non-detachable warrants or shares of stock as
a locked interest.3 2 Third, discretionary payments or payments of
a share of profits to holders of instruments closely resemble dividends.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 42 (1981). However, the "unofficial" status of the
attribution rules in the definition of substantial proportionality means that
the rules should not be technically applied when special circumstances warrant
otherwise.
374. See Beghe, supra note 362, at 210.
375. A hybrid instrument is one which is convertible into stock or provides for contingent payments to the holder. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(e)
(1980). See also notes 223-25 and accompanying text supra.
376. For a discussion of § 1.385-5, see notes 223-56 and accompanying text
supra.
377. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(c) (1980). See Supplementary Information to
Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,957, 18,960 (1980).
378. For a discussion of the determination of substantial proportionality,
see notes 357-74 and accompanying text supra.
379. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(c)(i) (1980).
380. See Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed.
Reg. 18,957, 18,960 (1980).
381. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(a) (1980). See notes 229-40 and accompanying
text supra.
382. See Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed.
Reg. 18,957, 18,960 (1980). Thus, this provision does not interfere with
legitimate business practices. See notes 258-62 and accompanying text supra.
383. See Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 4I5 Fed.
Reg. 18,957, 18,960 (1980).
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The evil that the rule was designed to eliminate is the pro rata
issuance of hybrid instruments. For example, assume that the fair
market value, on the date of issue, of the equity features associated
with the $100,000 of convertible debentures described in the illustration in section 1.385-6(c)(3) was anything less than $45,000.:s4
Why should the debentures be characterized as stock? The value
of the convertible debenture would be predominantly due to its
debt characteristics, and, under section 1.385-5(a), such an instrument would be treated as debt for tax purposes. 3 The reason why
this instrument, which would be treated as debt if issued by a public
corporation, is treated as stock when issued by a closely-held corporation, is the existence of substantial proportionality. Substantial
proportionality is consequently elevated to a position of primary
importance by section 1.385-6(c). 381 There does not appear to be
any conclusive justification for a single factor to attain such a sig8 7
nificant position in the resolution of the debt-equity controversy.
Moreover, because the conversion feature of an instrument is not
viewed by the courts as a significant factor indicating that an interest
is stock and not debt, 8 8 the regulations have departed from the
case law by elevating this factor to such a level of significance.
Finally, because of the difficulty of obtaining financing from
conventional sources, 8 9 generally the only market for the hybrid
securities of a closely-held corporation would be its own shareholders. A flat rule which treats these instruments as stock, thereby
prohibiting a deduction for interest payments, unduly burdens
closely-held corporations. The drafters suggest that such a rule
does not impose a hardship upon taxpayers since the same result
that a hybrid instrument obtains could also be achieved by issuing
a locked interest. However, to the extent that the locked interests
rule provides relief, it is difficult to see the necessity for section
1.385-6(c) in the first place.390 It is simply a trap for the unwary.
c. Adequate Capitalization
Under section 1.385-6(f)(1), 39 1 any instrument that is held by a
stockholder of the issuing corporation whose holdings of stock and
384. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(c)(3) (1980).
385. See id. § 1.385-5(a).
386. See id. § 1.385-6(c).
387. See note 8 supra and authorities cited therein.
388. Plumb, supra note 2, at 612.

389. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
390. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(c) (1980).
391. Id. § 1.385-6(0(1).
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instruments are substantially proportionate 392 is classified as Stock
if the *corporation's debt is excessive immediately after the instrument is issued by the corporation. 93 A corporation's debt is excessive if all the instrument's terms and conditions, together with
the corporation's financial structure, would not be satisfactory to
an arm's length lending institution.3 4 However, a safe harbor is
provided which states that a corporation's debt is not excessive if
the corporation's outside debt-equity ratio is less than or equal to
10:1, and the corporation's inside debt-equity ratio is less than or
equal to 3:1.30 The outside debt-equity ratio is computed under
section 1.3 8 5 -6(g).3 96 The inside ratio is determined in the same
manner, except liabilities to independent creditors are excluded
when comparing the corporation's liabilities to its shareholders'
equity.8 97 Both ratios are to be determined at the end of the year. 89
The justification for this provision is that the creditor investor
has, in circumstances in which his investment is subject to a high
degree of risk, placed his money at the risk of the business like a
shareholder since the likelihood of his being repaid significantly
depends upon the success or failure of the corporation. 399 However, the debt-equity ratio test specified by the safe harbor has
several deficiencies. First, the rule is not flexible. Only one set
of ratios is employed as the standard by which corporations in many
different industries, geographic locations, and financial conditions
will be judged. The ratio test was developed as an analytical tool
For use in the context of a particular industry rather than as an
arbitrary standard. 4°° A highly leveraged industry, such as the financial or real estate industries, has different capital needs than a manufacturing operation. The courts have taken into consideration the
392. For a discussion of substantial proportionality, see notes 344-74 and
accompanying text supra.

393. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(1) (1980).
394. Id. § 1.385-6(f)(2). The one exception to classification as stock when
the corporation has excessive debt allows instruments which are issued in exchange for an equal or greater principal amount of indebtedness. Id.

§ .385-6(f)(5).

395. Id. § 1.385-6(f)(3).
396. For a discussion of how to compute the outside debt-equity ratio, see
notes 108-47 and accompanying text supra.
397. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(f)(4) (1980).
398. Id.
399. See Spanbock, Carro, & Katz. supra note 116, at 688-89. See also
Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 407 (2d Cir. 1957); Ambassador
Apartments, Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 236, 245 (1968), afl'd, 406 F.2d
288 (2d Cir. 1969).
400. Spanbock, Carro, 9- Katz, supra note 116, at 689.
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needs and characteristics of a particular industry when applying the
ratio test. 401 The lack of flexibility in the safe harbor is at odds
with the congressional intent that regulations should be
drafted
which could accommodate a range of circumstances. 4 0 '-' Admittedly,
the failure of a corporation to pass the safe harbor test means only
that it must establish that it is adequately capitalized under the
general rule, which would take into account the industry involved
and other characteristics peculiar to that corporation. 40 3 However,
the lack of flexibility of the safe harbor results in unnecessary uncertainty and should be corrected.
Second, the safe harbor rule determines if adequate capitalization exists by using an inappropriately conservative standard.
Ratios considerably higher than 10:1 have been accepted by the
courts. 40 4 In addition, the Service has accepted a ratio of 20:1, as
long as capital is sufficient for normal business operations. 4 °- Furthermore, these ratios have been computed by using the fair market
values of individual assets to determine stockholders' equity, 400
whereas the regulations mandate the use of adjusted basis to determine the equity portion of the safe harbor ratio. 40 7 In an inflationary economy, the use of adjusted basis will generally result in a
higher ratio than if the fair market value of the assets were used.
The use of such a conservative computation procedure, as well as
the selection of such a conservative ratio, is inappropriate when
compared with the existing judicial authority. For this reason,
the ratio used should be raised, 40 perhaps to 15:1 or 20:1, or,
4°
alternatively, the computation procedure should be modified.
401. See Scotland Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 265, 273
(1965) (expert testimony received on whether company was adequately capitalized by industry standards). Professor Bittker has stated that what is excessive debt for one industry may be normal for another, and, even within the
same industry, no corporation is the same as another. Bittker, supra note
183, at 831.
402 See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 138 (1969) (rules should distinguish debt from equity in "variety of contexts in which this problem can
arise"). See also Gersham, Debt-Equity Proposals Provide Guidance but Pose
Problems for Small Corporations, 53 J. TAX. 194, 200 (1980).
403. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(0)(2) (1980).
404. See, e.g., Liflans Corp. v. United States, 390 F.2d 965 (Ct. Cl. 1968)
(17:1); Curry v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 667 (1965) (30:1); J. I. Morgan, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 881 (1958) (50:1); McDermott v. Commissioner, 13
T.C. 468 (1949) (19:1).
405. See Rev. Rul. 68-54, 1968-1 C.B. 69.
406. See notes 113-18 and accompanying text supra.
407. See notes 110-11 and accompanying text supra.
408. See Gersham, supra note 402, at 201.
409. See notes 120-31 and accompanying text supra.
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Third, extremely high debt-equity ratios have been accepted by
both the courts and the Service because the ratio is just one factor
to be considered. The United States Supreme Court has stated that
the debt-equity ratio may not be relevant in light of other factors. 410
The Tax Court has upheld the validity of indebtedness when a corporation had a ratio of nearly 700:1 by relying upon other factors
and finding the ratio not to be controlling. 411 Moreover, even the
Service recognizes that the ratio is just one factor among many to be
considered.4 1 2 In addition, some courts have never taken the position that the ratio test is to be given significant weight. 413 In light
of these facts, the safe harbor's great reliance upon the debt-equity
ratio, coupled with the use of such a conservative standard, is a
significant change from the position traditionally taken by the courts
and the Service.
d. Arm's Length Interest Rate
Under section 1.385-6(d)(1), 414 an instrument issued to a share-

holder in exchange for property is to be classified as stock if the
shareholder-creditor's holdings of stock and the instruments are
substantially proportionate,4 15 the stated annual rate of interest on
the instrument is not reasonable, 410 and the issuance of the instrument does not give rise to original issue discount under section
1232(a)(3) of the Code 417 or amortizable bond premium under see410. See John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 526 (1946).

411. See Baker Commodities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 374, 396 &
n.20 (1967) (6921:1).
412. See Rev. Rul. 77-437, 1977-2 C.B. 28; Rev. Rul. 63-54, 1968-1 C.B. 69.
413. See Rowan v. United States, 219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955).

In Rowan,

the Fifth Circuit stated:
[S]tockholders of corporations have always been free to commit to
corporate operations such capital as they choose and to lend such
additional amounts as they may elect to assist in the operation if that is
their true intent . . . . It would obviously work an unwarranted
interference by the courts . . . for us to say that there can be estab-

lished, as a matter of hindsight a ratio of stockholder owned debt to
the capital of the debtor corporation.
Id. at 55. The ratio in Rowan was 28:1 at its peak and 14:1 at the corporation's dissolution. See id. at 52. See also Sun Properties, Inc. v. United
States, 220 F.2d 171, 175 (5th Cir. 1955) (310:1).
414. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(d)(1) (1980). An exception to classification under this rule is provided, but, because it uses ambiguous standards, the exception
is of limited use. See id. § 1.385-6(d)(3).
415. See id. § 1.385-6(d)(1)(i). For a discussion of substantial proportionality and § 1.385-6(a), see notes 344-74 and accompanying text supra.
416. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(d)(I)(ii) (1980). For a discussion of § 1.3856(e) and what constitutes a reasonable rate, see notes 153-204 and accompanying text supra.
417. See I.R.C. § 1232(a)(3) (1976).
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tion 1.61-12(c)(2) of the regulations. 41 For purposes of applying
ihis provision, the reasonableness of a rate of interest is determined
419
as of the day an instrument is issued.
The Secretary apparently intends to legislate a special rule for
cases he believes Congress has overlooked. 420 In this case, Congress
has exempted ratable recognition of original issue discount where,
in general, a bond or other evidence of indebtedness is issued in
exchange for property.42 "1 Thus, in cases where the stated rate of
interest is less than a market rate of interest on similar obligations,
section 1232 provides that no original issue discount exists on obligations issued in exchange for property.4 2 The Secretary, on the
other hand, purports to deal with such transactions by treating the
obligations as stock. It is not clear that the Secretary's regulatory
authority under one provision of the Code prevails over situations
where Congress, in another section, has clearly dictated the income
tax consequences of a transaction. In an analogous situation, Tilford v. Commissioner,423 the Tax Court invalidated a regulation as
contrary to the express terms of another part of the Code. 424 - The
majority in Tilford held section 1.83-6(d) of the regulations invalid
as outside the scope of the statutory provisions of section 83 of the
418. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(2), T.D. 6984, 1969-1 C.B. 143. Ifinstruments are issued for property, § 1232(a)(3) of the Code and § 1.61-12(c)(2) of
the: regulations generally do not apply. See I.R.C. § 1232(a)(3) (1976); Treas.
Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(2), T.D. 6984, 1969-1 C.B. 143. See also note 306 and accompanying text supra.
419. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(d)(2) (1980).
420. The drafters of the regulations stated:
Section [1.385-6(d)] applies primarily to straight debt instruments
issued proportionately by a corporation to its shareholders in exchange
for property. If a straight debt instrument is issued to a shareholder
for money, there is generally no need for this rule. In this case,
§ 1.385-3(a) ensures, through the creation of original issue discount
under section 1232(a)(3) and amortizable bond premium under section
1.61-12(c)(2), that the holders will be paid principal and interest
in the proper portions .

.

.

. However, if instruments are issued

for property, section 1232(a)(3) and section 1.61-12(c)(2) generally
do not apply. Consequently, a special rule is needed to ensure that
the holders will be paid principal and interest in the proper proportions (i.e., in the same proportions as would be paid to outside
creditors). Thus, [§ 1.385-6(d)] imposes the requirement that interest
be' paid at a reasonable rate on instruments issued for property.
Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,957, 18,961
(1980).
421. See I.R.C. § 1232 (1976). In such a case, § 1232(b)(2) sets the issue
price equal to maturity value to avoid dealing with discounts and the amortization of discount. Id. See note 228 and accompanying text supra.
422. I.R.C' § 1232 (1976).
423. 75 T.C. 134 (1980).

424. Id. at 150-51.
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Code.4 25 The regulation, which provided that the transaction involved must be treated as a contribution to capital and not as a
transaction upon which gain or loss may be realized, was held to be
contrary to an express provision of section 1001 of the Code. 42 6
Tilford, then, supports the view that the Secretary may not fill in
a perceived gap in a statute through section 1.385-6(d).4 2

7

If the Secretary must attempt to establish a rule for instruments
issued for property, the all or nothing approach to classification
under section 1.385-6(d) seems to be particularly questionable.4 28
An approach similar to that set forth in section 1232 of the Code
and section 1.61-12(c)(2) of the regulations could be adopted as to
these types of instruments. This approach would compute the valuation of an instrument given for property as though it had been
given for cash. This position is more desirable from the standpoint
of the Secretary's authority, although it does sacrifice some certainty
by requiring valuation.
In any event, a period should be provided during which the
interest rate could be adjusted to come within the reasonable range
of interest rates of the rule of convenience 429 so that the stated interest rate on the date of issuance will not have the potential of
causing an instrument to be forever classified as stock. There does
not seem to be any reason why the rule that is applicable to demand
loans should not be made applicable to section 1.385-6(d). The
interest rate, therefore, would be treated as reasonable if it is within
the reasonable range on any day of the taxable year in which the
4 0
instrument was issued. 3

The second provision which attempts to insure an arm's length
interest rate is section 1.385-6(l)(1). 431 Under this regulation, instruments that are payable on demand and are owned by shareholders
whose holdings of stock and the instruments are substantially pro425. Id.

426. Id. at 145. For a discussion of Tilford, see Arlinghaus, Tax Court
Questions Validity of Restricted Property Regulations, 59 TAXES 261, 262

(1981).

427. See also Bates v. United States, 581 F.2d 575, 579 (6th Cir. 1978)
(regulations may not be used to supply supposed omissions in revenue act
or enlarge scope of statute); Smith v.Commissioner, 332 F.2d 671, 673 (9th
Cir. 1964) (Commissioner may not prescribe regulations inconsistent with
statute nor add restrictions to statute).
428. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(d) (1980).
429. See notes 159-65 and accompanying text supra.
430. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(0(2) (1980).
431. Id. § 1.385-6(0(1).
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pbrtionate 432 are classified as stock if the stated annual interest rate

on the instruments is not reasonable on the day of issue.438
'Ifan instrument is due on a fixed date, section 1.385-3(a) will
operate to insure that the fair market value of the instrument is
4 4
equal to the consideration paid for it.
3
In addition, to the extent
that the fair market value of an instrument differs from its face
value at maturity; either original issue discount under section 1232
of the Code or amortizable bond premium under section 1.61-12(c)
(2) ofthe regulations is created. This treatment is sufficient to assure that the interest rate is reasonable. 435 On the other hand, if an
instrument is payable on demand, neither original issue discount
nor bond premium will ordinarily be created under section 1.3853(a).480 Thus, section 1.385-6(l)(1) is justified under the rationale
that the valuation approach to demand instruments will not be
adequate to assure that the interest rate is reasonable.
Although this rationale may be technically correct, the characterization of a demand note as stock if the stated interest rate is not
reasonable is harsh and unwarranted. A preferable approach would
be the imposition of a presumptive one-year term to maturity with
respect to a demand note. The note could then be revalued under
section 1.385-3(a) on that basis and the rules associated with original
issue discount and amortizable bond premium could be made applicable to any resulting discount or premium. Such an approach
would insure that a reasonable, arm's length interest rate was being
enforced with respect to a demand instrument without classifying
the entire instrument as stock, although by requiring valuation it
sacrifices some certainty.
Criticism of a rule which classifies a demand
instrument as
stock rather than indebtedness when the interest rate is unreasonable also seems appropriate since it is often difficult to determine the
rate at which independent creditors would loan money on similar
terms to companies in the same general business, geographic loca432. Id. For a discussion of substantial proportionality, see notes 357-74
and accompanying text supra.
433. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(1) (1980). For a discussion of what constitutes *a reasonable rate, see notes 153-204 and accompanying text supra.

434. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) (1980).
supra.

See note 297 and accompanying text

435. See notes 301-04 and accompanying text supra.
436. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) (1980). See Supplementary Information to
Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,957, 18,961 (1980). See also note 305
and accompanying text supra.
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tion, and financial condition as the borrower.43 7 Moreover, if the
loan represents risk capital to a young, promising business, the rule
of convenience under the reasonable interest rate test 418 will prob
ably not be available because such corporations generally have debtequity ratios greater than 1:1. Therefore, section 1.385-6(l)(l)
should be amended to provide a rule of convenience for all corporations, irrespective of their debt-equity ratios, thus making the section
1.385-6(e)(2) rule of convenience and its debt-equity ratio test in-,
applicable. Alternatively, the provision could provide that, if the
interest rate paid on demand debt is not considered to be an arm's
length rate, then an arm's length rate would be imputed to both the
corporation and the shareholder-creditor. For example, if the interest charged is ten percent and an arm's length rate is determined to
be fourteen percent, the additional four percent could be imputed
as income to the shareholder-creditor and an equal amount could
48 9
be deductible to the corporation.
e. Arm's Length Enforcement of an Instrument's Terms
The modifications and exceptions to the general rule examined
thus far deal with the possibility that the terms of an instrument
might not reflect arm's length economic reality. Four provisiofs
discussed in this section of this article demonstrate that there is also
concern that the terms of an instrument might not be enforced at
arm's length.
Under the existing case law, a failure to enforce the terr
debt instrument is considered evidence that the shareholder and the
corporation did not intend to establish a debtor-creditor relationship
at the time the instrument was issued.440 This fact is one of the
factors considered in determining whether there is a reasonable
437. This is the standard used by the general rule to determine whether
an interest rate is reasonable. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e) (1980).
438. Id. § 1.385-6 (e)(2). See notes 159-65 and accompanying text supra.
439. Cf. I.R.C. §483 (1976). Section 1.385-6()(4) provides one excep tion
to classification under § 1.385-6()(1).
Section 1.385-6(0(1) does not apply
to an instrument that is actually repaid within six months, provided that
the total outstanding principal amounts of the demand loans plus the total
outstanding balance of all loans described in § 1.385-7(a) (2)(i) does :not
exceed $25,000 on the day of issue. For this purpose, an instrument is not
considered to be actually retired if it is reissued, renewed, or offset in any

manner. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(0(4) (1980).

This rule is consistent with

judicial precedent. See Plumb, supra note 2, at 481.
440. See Dillin v. United States, 433 F.2d 1097, 1102 (5th Cir. 1970); Austin
Village, Inc. v. United States, 432 F.2d 741, 745 (6th Cir. 1970); A. R. Lantz
Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1970); Thompson v. Con.missioner, 73 T.C. 878, 895 (1980); Davis v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 814, 836-37
(1978).
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expectation of repayment. 44 I The regulations, on the other hand,
are not concerned with the subjective intent or expectation of the
parties at the outset. Instead, a "wait and see" attitude is adopted
toward instruments which qualify as debt instruments when issued.
The provisions provide for potential reclassification of debt instruments into stock if the terms of the instruments are not properly
enforced. Additionally, the rules operate to reclassify an instrument only from indebtedness to stock. Once an instrument has
been classified as stock, it can never again attain debt status." r
The first of these provisions is section 1.385-6(k)(1), which
treats an instrument as stock if: 1) a corporation fails to pay all or
part of the interest that is due on the instrument during a taxable
year; 44 2) a shareholder of the issuing corporation is the owner of
the instrument and his holdings of stock and the instruments are
substantially proportionate, 444 and 3) the owner of the instrument
fails to pursue available remedies with the ordinary diligence of an
independent creditor.445 Reclassification of the instrument from
indebtedness to stock is retroactive to the later of the first day of the
taxable year in which the failure to pay occurs or the first day on
which section 1.385-6(k)(1) is applied to the instrument. 416 A failure
to pay interest means failure actually to pay within ninety days after
the end of the year accrual. 447 However, for purposes of classifica441. See note 7 supra.
442. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(b)(1) (1980).
443. See notes 447-48 and accompanying text infra.
444. See notes 357-74 and accompanying text supra.
445. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(b)(1) (1980).
446. Id. § 1.385-6(k)(1).
The regulations, at first glance, seem to favor
the taxpayer in this instance. Under the case law, failure to pay interest
or repay principal is considered evidence that the parties did not intend to
create debt in the original transaction. Santa Anita Consol., Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 536, 554 (1968). In Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner.
23 T.C. 419 (1954), aff'd, 23 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1957), the Tax Court 'stated:
The fact that the majority of the notes here involved, all of which
have long since matured, have not been paid lends corroboration to
our finding that at no time material to our consideration did the
noteholders intend to enforce payment of their notes or assert the
rights of bona fide creditors.
23 T.C. at 426. Thus, if an advance is determined by the court to be equity,
it is treated as equity from the beginning. On the other hand, the regulations do not go back so far in time and therefore seem to be in the taxpayer's favor. It must be realized, however, that the instrument has already
satisfied the other sections and rules of the § 385 regulations and therefore
will bear a reasonable rate of interest and possess the other characteristics required to come under the general rule that interests are treated as debt. The
Service is not as generous as it first appears.
447. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(k)(8) (1980). Payment of interest with property
other than money will constitute an actual payment, but only to the extent of
the property's fair market value. Id.
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tion under section 1.385-6(k)(1), interest which accrues while this
448
section does not apply to the instrument is disregarded.
Given the current state of the national economy and the current
disarray of the capital markets, the ninety day grace period for nonpayment of interest is too short for many small businesses and should
be expanded to provide greater flexibility.44 9
It is necessary to determine what constitutes "the ordinary diligence.of an independent creditor" in analyzing whether this provision will operate to reclassify a debt instrument into stock. The
evil feared by the Secretary is that a shareholder will not enforce
his ,creditor rights to the detriment of his rights as a shareholder.
But it is. not clear what standard the Secretary will use in determining whether a shareholder has exercised the "ordinary: diligence
of an independent creditor" in protecting his rights .as a creditor.
Hopefully, the Secretary will not adopt the conservative bank lender
as a model in applying this section. Such a standard would not conform with the case law, which generally does not require a slhareholder-creditor to be as strict as a conservative banker 450 as long as
he acts in the same manner as an independent creditor. 451 This
position is based on the realities of the lending industry for, in practice, all lenders are not conservative bankers. Often a firm is unable to meet its current obligations due to temporary cash flowproblems or some other unforeseen circumstances. If there is a
reasonable expectation for success in the future, it would be to the
lender's benefit to bear with a financially-troubled corporation until
its financial health improves. However, if a shareholder-lender
does so by foregoing interest payments or by postponing the maturity date, the Secretary could apply a conservative bank lender
standard and interpret this action as a refusal to enforce creditor
rights to the detriment of shareholder rights. The loan would
then be reclassified as stock.
The drafters of the regulations apparently believe that a less
rigorous standard will be applied. In response to comments con448. Id. § 1.385-60k)(4)(i).

Thus, the fact that the corporation has not

paid interest on debt which is held by an independent creditor or a shareholder whose holdings of stock and debt are not proportionate will not cause
the instrument to be treated as stock if a shareholder buys the' instrument
from the independent creditor, or the holdings become proportional. See
id. § 1.385-6(k)(4)(ii).
449. See Gersham, supra note 402, at 199.
450. See Earle v. W.J. Jones 9- Son, Inc., 200 F.2d 846, 850 (9th Cir.
1952); Curry v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 667, 681 (1965); Motel* Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 825, 833 (1963), af"d on other grounds, 310
F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1965).
451. See Plumb, supra note 2, at 495-96.
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cerning the proposed regulations, the drafters stated that the Treasury "recognizes that independent creditors do not always bring
suit" to enforce their rights. 452 An example was added to the final

regulations to clarify this point. It provides that past payment
history, a pledge of collateral by the debtor corporation, and other
unspecified facts and circumstances may warrant the shareholdercreditor's failure to file suit.4 5 3

However, the ambiguity of the

standard used by this section of the regulations may allow the Secretary to insist upon more action by a shareholder-creditor where
the Secretary feels there is a tax avoidance scheme involved.
In addition, the subjective nature of the standard used in this
provision is bound to engender numerous disputes and costly litigation by forcing a determination as to what a hypothetical creditor
would do in a similar situation. Because of the cyclical operations
of many small corporations, it is not unusual for an independent
creditor to work with a financially troubled debtor by extending
the time for payment, lowering the interest rate temporarily or permanently, allowing lump sum payments to be made in advance of
or after due dates, or making other special arrangements. It is
impossible for a closely-held corporation or its creditor-shareholder
to determine accurately what legal remedies would have been taken
by an independent creditor or what concessions such a creditor
would have made. The degree of diligence with which an independent creditor pursues available remedies will depend upon a
plethora of factors. Some of these factors include the debtor's potential earnings and geographic location, alternative investment
opportunities of the creditor, the creditor's prior success or failure
With the debtor corporation or similar businesses, the general state
of the economy nationwide and in the local community, and the
lender's interest in the scientific or innovative aspects of the debtor's
business. The probable result of this provision will be to convert
debt to stock whenever a corporation has financial difficulties and is
unable to pay the accrued interest or principal on a debt instrument
held by one of its shareholders. Therefore, the Secretary should
clarify what standard will be used in applying section 1.385-6(k).
Alternatively, the regulation could be amended to provide a more
equitable and objective rule.
The second provision is section 1.385-6(l)(3), which provides
that if a corporation fails to pay the principal on any instrument
within ninety days after the principal is due, and the holder fails
452. T.D. 7747, 1981-8 I.R.B. 15.
453. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(k)(2), Example 3 (1980).
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to pursue available remedies with the ordinary diligence of an
independent creditor, the instrument will be treated as a demand
45
instrument from the day after the date the principal was due. 1
Therefore, the instrument becomes subject to reclassification as
stock under the provisions of sections 1.385-6(l)(1) and 1.385-6(l)(2).
This provision does provide a ninety day grace period for nonpayment of principal. However, given the chaotic nature of current
capital markets, this period is too short to provide any flexibility
to a business with liquidity problems. A grace period of six months,
or even twelve months, would probably be more reasonable.
The third provision concerned with arm's length enforcement
is section 1.385-6()(2), which provides that a debt instrument that
is payable on demand, either by its terms or by reason of section
1.38 5 -6(l)(3), and which is owned by a shareholder of the issuing
corporation whose holdings of stock and the instruments are substantially proportionate, 455 may be reclassified as stock. 456 This
reclassification would be effective as of the first day of the taxable
year in which the interest actually paid during the year on the instrument is not reasonable 457 as determined under section 1.3856(e). 45 8 In other words, in the case of a demand instrument, the
reasonableness of the interest rate must be re-determined for each
taxable year in which the instrument is owned by a shareholder with
substantially proportionate holdings of stock and instruments, and
that amount of interest must actually be paid by the corporation
during the year. For example, if a corporation issues a demand
instrument which is treated as indebtedness when issued because
it provides a stated annual rate of interest that is reasonable on
the date of issue, and, in a subsequent year, the rate of interest considered reasonable under section 1.385-6(e) rises or falls, the corporation must actually pay interest at the new reasonable rate. For
purposes of reclassification, a rate of interest is considered to be
reasonable if it is reasonable as of any day of the particular taxable
year.

450

There are two exceptions to reclassification under this subsection. First, reclassification does not apply to an instrument that is
actually retired within six months after the day of issue, provided
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.

Id. § 1.385(6)(0 (3). See notes 450-53 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 357-74 and accompanying text supra.
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6()(2) (1980).
Id.
See notes 153-204 and accompanying text supra.
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(1)(2) (1980).
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that the sum of the outstanding principal amount of all demand
instruments plus the outstanding balance of all "certain other obligations," as defined in section 1.385-7(a)(2)(i), does not exceed
$25,000 on the day of the issue. 460 For this purpose, an instrument
is not considered to be actually retired if it is reissued, renewed, or
offset in any manner. 4 1 The second exception makes section 1.3866(l)(2) inapp!icable if a failure to pay interest on an instrument at
a reasonable rate is caused solely by a failure to pay interest when
due. In that situation, it is noted that section 1.385-6(k) will be
42
applicable.
It may be recalled from the discussion above dealing with the
provisions to insure an arm's length interest rate that section 1.3856(l)(1) operates to classify a demand instrument as stock if the shareholder-lender's holdings are substantially proportionate and if the
stated rate of interest is not reasonable under section 1.385-6(e) at
the time of issuance. 46 3 Section 1.385-6(l)(2) implements the same
rule, with the additional requirement that the reasonable interest
must actually be paid. This is consistent with ordinary commercial
practice when demand instruments are held by independent
464
creditors.
The fourth and final rule which deals with the enforcement
of the terms of an instrument recognizes that the regulations would
be useless if the corporation and the shareholder could change the
terms of an instrument at will. Accordingly, section 1.385-6(j)(1 )
states that if a debt instrument is owned by a shareholder of the
issuing corporation whose holdings of stock and the instruments are
substantially proportionate 46 and if the holder agrees to make a
substantial change in the terms of the instrument, then the instrument is treated as newly issued for property on the day of the
4 66
agreement.
The day of agreement is the day on which the issuer and the
holder enter into a binding contract to change the terms of an instrument. 4 7 On that date, a new determination must be made as
to whether the instrument conforms to arm's length standards by
460. Id. § 1.385-6(e)(4)(i).
461. Id.
462. See notes 446-53 and accompanying text supra.
463. See notes 433-44 and accompanying text supra.
464. Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg.
18,957, 18,963 (1980).
465. See notes 357-74 and accompanying text supra.
466. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(j)(1) (1980).
467. Id. § 1.385-6(j)(3).
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applying the rules regarding the issuance of an instrument for
property.468 For example, if the change of terms converts the
instrument into a hybrid instrument by a change of fixed payments
of interest or principal into contingent payments or by an addition
of conversion rights, the rules regarding the issuance of hybrid
instruments will be applied.
The regulations define a substantial change in the terms of
an instrument as any change which materially affects the fair market value of the instrument. 4 9 Examples of substantial changes
include postponement of the maturity date,470 a change in the interest rate, and subordination. 471 On the other hand, neither a
substitution of collateral nor a prepayment is ordinarily considered
472
to be a substantial change.
Upon first examination, the rules relating to a change in the
terms of an existing debt obligation, which basically provide for the
re-examination of the obligation under the various tests set forth
in the regulations following any substantial modification of the obligation, seem reasonable and equitable. Indeed, with respect to
large, publicly-held corporations, these rules probably are appropriate. However, small businesses require flexibility in structuring
and restructuring financing. It is not uncommon for small business
lenders to liberalize the terms of a debt instrument as the borrowing
company's financial position improves, renegotiate the terms as a
borrower's financial condition deteriorates, or renegotiate to accommodate new infusions of debt or equity capital as long as the lender's
position as a creditor under state law remains intact. The rule on
substantial changes in terms would appear to restrict unnecessarily
the shareholder-lender's flexibility and ability to deal effectively
with the problems of a small business.
VIII.

CoNcLusIoN:

A

SUGGESTED APPROACH

This article has argued that the courts will probably find some
of the provisions of the section 385 regulations invalid either because
they exceed the Secretary's authority 478 or are inconsistent with ju468. Id. § 1.385-60)(1).
469. Id. § 1.385-6(j)(2).
470. Id. § 1.385-60)(1).
471. Id. § 1.385-6(j)(4), Examples 2 & 3.

See also id. § 1.385-6(j)(2).

472. Id. § 1.385-6(j)(2).
473. See id. §§ 1.385-3(a), -6(d), -9(a). For discussion of these sections of
the regulations, see notes 319-23, 420-30, 9- 269-74 and accompanying text
supra.
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dicial authority. 474 At the very least, the offending provisions will
probably be eroded by construction in the courts. 475 It has also
been argued that while the criteria in some provisions are difficult
to understand and apply, 47 6 other regulations provide significant
477
certainty at the unnecessary expense of flexibility.
Moreover, the regulations are biased against the small, closelyheld corporation. For example, the regulations focus upon interests held by shareholders.4 7 Large corporations, which do not depend on shareholder capital alone, are consequently not affected by
many of the rules. Furthermore, large publicly-held corporations
seem to be protected by the safe harbors from onerous provisions to
a greater extent than their smaller counterparts. 47 9 Finally, many
provisions are inconsistent with the realities of financing small,
closely-held enterprises. 480 Curiously, the Secretary has expended
a great deal of effort to prevent the regulations from adversely impacting upon the normal financing of large corporations. 48 '
474. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-5(a), -6(f), -7(b)(2), -8(a) (1980). For discussion of these sections of the regulations, see notes 248-56, 399-413, 339-41,
& 259-62 and accompanying text supra.
475. Manifestly, a court has three options when confronted with a regulation which produces a result apparently inconsistent with the terms of a
statute. It can: 1) determine that the regulation is inconsistent with the
terms of the statute and hold the regulation invalid; 2) find that the regulation is not applicable to the particular facts and circumstances of the case;
or 3) it can hold the regulation valid but interpret it so that it produces a
result consistent with the terms of the statute. Since there is a presumption of
validity associated with Treasury regulations, the courts many times opt for a
strained interpretation of a regulation rather than a sensible reading of. the
regulation combined with a finding of invalidity. See, e.g., Commissioner v.
Sternberger's Estate, 348 U.S. 187 (1955); United Telecommunications Inc. v.
Commissioner, 589 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir. 1978), afJ'g 65 T.C. 278 (1975);
House v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1972); Ballance v. United
States, 347 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1965).
476. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.,385-5(a), -6(a), -6(f), -6(k)(1), -6(e)(1), -9(a)
(1980). For discussion of these sections of the regulations, see notes 246, 269,
344-74, 394, 450-54, 437, & 285-86 and accompanying text supra.
477. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-5(a), -6(f), -6(j) (1980). For discussion of
these sections of the regulations, see notes 241-56, 395-403, & 465-72 and accompanying text supra.
478. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
479. See notes 59-62 & 359 and accompanying text supra.
480. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-3(a), -6(c), -6(e), -6(j), -9(a) (1980). For discussion of these sections of the regulations, see notes 316, 389, 465-72, 432-39, &
289-91 and accompanying text supra.
481. The fact that many safe harbors. protect the normal financing arrangements of large corporations from potential attack may be evidence of
this fact. See notes 59-62 & 359 and accompanying text supra. In addition,
the Secretary has interpreted § 1.385-10 in a way that commonly encountered
preferred stock issues of large corporations will not be within the scope of
that provision. See T.D. 7747, 1981-8 I.R.B. 15.
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In light of these problems, it is suggested that these regulations
should be withdrawn and reconsidered. It would seem that an
Whittingexpanded version of the approach suggested by8 Professors
2
Under their apton and Whittenberg would be appropriate.
proach, all the factors utilized by the courts would be identified.4 8'
These factors would then be used to determine the broad characteristics of pure indebtedness. 4814 As part of this process, specific factors
would be associated with each of the broad characteristics identified.
These factors would indicate what evidence is important with respect to analyzing each broad characteristic. Having identified the
appropriate characteristics of indebtedness and the factual evidence
relevant for analyzing each characteristic, the regulations could
specify a mechanical test similar to the test specified in section
301.7701-2(a)(1) of the regulations for determining whether an association is a corporation. 4 5 An interest would therefore be treated
as debt if the interest exhibited more characteristics of debt than
48 0

equity.
This approach would be a significant improvement over the
regulations for a number of reasons. First, such an approach would
clearly be within the authority delegated to the Secretary by section
385. Second, it would be consistent with the existing case law. The
regulations would attempt to ascertain whether creditors intended
to place their capital at the risk of the business, like a shareholder,
or whether they intended to create a debt interest. The determina482. See Whittington & Whittenburg, supra note 178, at 417.
483. Id. at 411-13. See note 7 supra.
484. Whittington & Whittenburg, supra note 178, at 411-13. Whittington and Whittenburg have applied the statistical technique of factor analysis
to twelve variables which the courts have considered in distinguishing debt
from equity, and ascertained four broad considerations useful for making such
a distinction: 1) creating, in substance, a debt transaction; 2) instrument form
and provisions; 3) the financial condition of the corporation when the instrument was issued; and 4) maintaining the separation of interests of shareholders and holders of the instrument in question. Id. at 413-15. In addition,
factor analysis showed which variables would be important with respect to
making determinations for each broad consideration. Id. For example, regular
payments, subordination of the security, relationship of stock holdings to security holdings, contingent payments, and the business purpose for debt creation were determined to be important factors to consider when drawing conclusions concerning the creation, in substance, of a debt transaction. Id.
485. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1), T.D. 7515, 1977-2 C.B. 482. The
regulations identify six major characteristics present in a pure corporation
which, if taken together, distinguish it from other organizations. Id. The regulations provide that an association which is not incorporated under state law
will not be classified as a corporation unless it possesses more corporate than
noncorporate characteristics, disregarding those characteristics that are common
to both corporate and noncorporate entities. Id.
486. Id.
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tion of this intent would be made with reference to the characteristics of the interests created by the parties to the transaction. It is
true that such an approach is not an exact science. However, in
light of the heavily factual nature of the debt-equity classification
issue, it seems reasonable to focus on all the facts and circumstances
in an attempt to determine whether the interest in question resembles debt or whether its characteristics require classification as
48 7

equity.

In addition, such an approach would provide more certainty
than exists under current case law by organizing the factors presently considered by the courts and using them to determine which
of the characteristics of pure indebtedness are present in any given
case. In this way, evidence which is important for resolving the
debt-equity classification issue will be described. In order to provide even more certainty, objective safe harbors similar to those
contained in the current regulations could be formulated with respect to each characteristic identified in the regulations. This approach would provide as much certainty as is provided by the current regulations and at the same time would retain the flexibility
of the current case law. Moreover, establishing evidence concerning the intent of the parties within this suggested framework would
not be any more difficult than working with the current difficult
to understand mechanical rules.
487. See Casco Bank K Trust Co. v. United States, 544 F.2d 528, 534 n.9
(1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied. 430 U.S. 907 (1978) (section 385 cited as evidence
that Congress acknowledged that debt-equity problem should be handled by
using factual approach).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1981

71

